321. Stalin had met with Tukhachevsky six times in 1931, eight times in 1932, seven times in 1933, twice in 1934, and three times in 1935. Stalin again received him on July 21, 1935, with Voroshilov and Yegorov, among others. Na prieme, 154, 718. In April 1936, Banner of Russia, a Russian-language monthly published by the emigration in Prague, concluded a sensational four-part series about “Kraskomov,” said to be a clandestine organization of Red Army commanders plotting a putsch. The April issue offered responses to letters received doubting Kraskomov’s existence and wondering, if it did exist, why Banner of Russia would expose it. A military coup to save Russia from Communism was a long-standing fantasy of the emigration, which was penetrated by the Soviet secret police. Lukes, Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler, 92–4; Znamia Rossii, Dec. 1935, Feb., March, and April 1936. In parallel, Voroshilov had received a convoluted secret report that insinuated a “secret connection” between Red Army and Nazi military circles would enable the Germans to bring forth a “friendly” regime in Moscow. The report, said to be by a White Russian officer for the French General Staff, had been shared with the Czechoslovak staff, which, in turn, passed it to Moscow. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, 185–6 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 740, l. 170–5: Dec. 6–7, 1935).
322. The trade protocol was signed on April 29, 1936. DGFP, series C, V: 488–94. See also Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 35–6; and DGFP, series C, IV: 1009–10 (Jan. 18, 1936). On April 19, Litvinov had fretted to Surits in Berlin that any new large trade deal with Germany would alienate France and “play into Hitler’s hands.” Abramov, “Osobaia missiia Davida Kandelaki,” 149 (citing AVP RF, f. 010, op. 11, pap. 68, d. 34, l. 85 –7).
323. Bessonov’s offer included walking back criticism (made by Litvinov in Geneva) of the Rhineland militarization. DGFP, series C, V: 512 (Andor Hencke: May 6, 1936). Bessonov was accompanied by Yevgeny Gnedin, who would later falsely deny the involvement of himself or the foreign affairs commissariat in efforts to win over Nazi Germany. Gnedin, Katastrofa i votrooe rozhdenie, 34–5. Andor Hencke had been German consul in Kiev, and witnessed the famine.
324. Schacht, who was trying to rein in expenditures and inflation, miscalculated in suggesting Göring’s appointment. Overy, Göring, 40. Stalin had received Kandelaki without foreign affairs commissariat personnel on March 16, 1936; again, five days later, with a slew of police, intelligence, and military men; and finally, with Litvinov and Stomonyakov on April 4. Na prieme, 181, 183.
325. DGFP, series C, V: 571–3 (May 20, 1936).
326. Niclauss, Die Sowjetunion, 192 (citing Dirksen report, May 19, 1936).
327. DGFP, series C, V: 572.
328. Dembski, “Pol’sko-Sovetskie otnosheniia,” 196–7 (citing Akten zur Deutschen Austwärtigen Politik [ADAP], series C, VI/1: doc. 341); and Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warszawa, MSZ, Kabinet Ministra, 108, A.T. II, k. 47–8). Germany remained in arrears on paying transit costs for freight through the Polish Corridor, owing to hard currency shortages. On May 22, 1935, during a monologue with Polish ambassador Lipski, Hitler alluded to the need to build a railroad through the Polish Corridor, according to the Polish record—information Stalin received. Morozov, Pol’sko-Chekhoslovatskie otnosheniia, 242 (citing AVP RF, f. 02, op. 1, d. 35, l. 162–9: Lipski from Berlin, May 27, 1935). Von Moltke had broached the railroad idea to Beck back on May 26, 1934. Wojciechowski, Stosunki polsko-niemieckie, 200–1, 232.
329. Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 157 (citing RGASPI, f. 78, op. 1, d. 636, l. 73). Leopold Trepper, the military intelligence operative, recalled Berzin saying that “here we talk the whole time about the Nazi threat, but it is envisioned as something very far off.” Trepper, Bol’shaia igra, 79.
330. Robertson, “Hitler and Sanctions.” Mussolini had given approval for Hitler’s Rhineland remilitarization in advance.
