160. Codovilla was replaced in Spain by Togliatti. Kudriashov, SSSR i grazhdanskaia voina v Ispanii, 283–8 (APRF, f. 3, op. 65, d. 225, l. 2–10). See also Payne, Spanish Civil War, 32. In 1938, Stalin would twice come to the conclusion that the Communists should quit the Popular Front government and form a new government of just Communists and Socialists; both times, Dimitrov—of all people—appears to have talked Stalin out of it. Meshcheriakov, “SSSR i grazhdanskaia voina v Ispanii,” 93 (citing RGASPI, f. 495, op. 74, d. 216, l. 2; TsPA VS BSP, f. 146, op. 2, d. 42, l. 1). In February–March 1938, Pascua tried to impress upon Potyomkin the dire military and economic situation of the Spanish Republic; the upshot was a Soviet $70 million loan to Spain, which had spent down its gold reserves. Kudriashov, SSSR i grazhdanskaia voina v Ispanii, 325–37 (APRF, f. 3, op. 65, d. 226, l. 28–31, 33–5, 37–8, 39; d. 232, l. 46, d. 234, l. 165–6, d. 226, l. 57–8, 42–4, 45, 46–460b., 59–60). By April 1938, Pascua had been transferred to Paris. He wrote yet another artful letter to Stalin, offering his gratitude on behalf of Spain. Kudriashov, SSSR i grazhdanskaia voina v Ispanii, 338 (citing APRF, f. 3, op. 65, d. 226, l. 64–64ob.). In Aug. 1938 Pascua came to Moscow from Paris, with a letter to Stalin from Negrín. But by Aug. 29, 1938, Dimitrov and Manuilsky were writing to Stalin about the evacuation of the international brigades from Spain. Kudriashov, SSSR i grazhdanskaia voina v Ispanii, 344 (APRF, f. 3, op. 65, d. 226, l. 83), 346–7 (l. 85), 354–5 (l. 109), 358 (l. 119–20).
161. Roshchin, Politicheskaia istoriia Mongolii.
162. They reconvened the next day, too. Na prieme, 218.
163. Iakovenko, Agnessa, 95. The Soviet envoy, Vladimir Tairov (Teryan), an Armenian, arrested on Aug. 5, 1937, was evidently being convoyed in the other direction (to Moscow) along the same route.
164. Papkov, Stalinskii terror v Sibiri, 269; Iakovenko, Agnessa, 97–8.
165. Pavliukov, Ezhov, 382–7; Pravda, Aug. 29, 1937; Kolarz, Peoples of the Soviet Far East, 138–9. The secret autopsy cited death “as a result of . . . external poison.” Luzianin, “Rossiia-Mongoliia-Kitai,” 323.
166. Dashpürev and Soni, Reign of Terror in Mongolia, 33–5. Captain Bimba, who defected to the Japanese, told them about a pro-Japanese conspiracy among the Mongol elite to which Demid supposedly belonged. But Bimba’s account is highly inconsistent and often blatantly wrong about dates and verifiable facts. Coox, Nomonhan, 161–3 (who largely accepts the testimony of defector Captain Bimba); Dashpürev and Soni, Reign of Terror in Mongolia, 2–3 (who point out that the testimony is unreliable).
167. RGANI, f. 89, op. 63, d. 26, l. 1.
168. Choibalsan had denounced Demid to Voroshilov in Oct. 1936. Baabar, Twentieth-Century Mongolia, 355–6, 360.
169. When Frinovsky returned from Mongolia, his possible transfer to the defense commissariat, as deputy commissar, was evidently bruited. Protocol of Frinovsky interrogation, sent by Beria to Stalin April 11, 1939: http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/193_dok/19390413beria.php (APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 373, l. 3–44: protocol of Frinovsky interrogation, Beria to Stalin, April 11, 1939).
170. Dashpürev and Soni, Reign of Terror in Mongolia; Sandag and Kendall, Poisoned Arrows.
171. Genden was never repatriated and was executed in Moscow in Nov. Pavliukov, Ezhov, 388; Kaplonski, “Prelude to Violence”; Baabar, Twentieth-Century Mongolia, 361–2.
172. Khlevniuk, “Economic Officials in the Great Terror,” 61 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 997, l. 79–82; op. 120, d. 339, l. 42; op. 3, d. 992, l. 28: Feb. 1938; op. 120, d. 339, l. 57).
173. At the Feb.–March 1937 plenum, Stalin had referred to the top 3,000–4,000 officials as the “general staff of the party.” Kosheleva et al., “Materialy fevral’-martovskogo plenuma TsK VKP (b) 1937 goda” (1995, no. 3), 14. In one ward of Smolensk city for which we have data, forty-one people born in the nineteenth century were promoted in 1937–38—not exactly new people. Thurston, Life and Terror, 133 (citing the Smolensk archive).
174. The budget for 1938 envisioned 160,400; the actual number would be 180,500. Khlevniuk, “Economic Officials in the Great Terror,” 60 (citing GARF, f. 5446, op. 22, d. 1065, l. 19–20; d. 1060, l. 89).
