86. Pavlov, in testimony after his arrest, would not mention Timoshenko mentioning Directive No. 1, but he would note that when he hung up the phone, he (Pavlov) had ordered all units to combat readiness. http://liewar.ru/tragediya-22–iyunya/178–protoko ly-doprosa-d-g-pavlova.html (Pavlov testimony, July 7, 1941, with commentary). Pavlov might have spoken with Timoshenko earlier, from the theater, by a special telephone brought in for just such a contingency.
87. “Itinerar Hitlers vom 1.9.1939–31.12.1941,” 691. Hitler had written to Antonescu on June 14. Supposedly, already on June 12 Antonescu was let in on the closely guarded secret of the precise date of attack. Schmidt,
88. Goebbels added: “Feverish activity begins.” Fröhlich,
89. Pospelov,
90. Zoller,
91. Mertsalov and Mertsalova,
92. Gorodetsky, whose account of Stalin’s approach to foreign policy stands above all others in English, overreacted to attributions of Soviet expansionism to ideology. “Stalin was little affected by sentiment or ideology in the pursuit of foreign policy,” Gorodetsky wrongly imagined. “His statesmanship was rooted in Russia’s tsarist legacy, and responded to imperatives deep within its history . . . Stalin’s policy appears to have been rational and level-headed.” Obviously, Sovietization of the Baltic states, eastern Poland, Bessarabia, and Bukovina, or Stalin’s obsession with Trotsky and his terror, had nothing to do with realpolitik or level-headedness. Indeed, Gorodetsky himself writes, two pages on, of the “paranoiac atmosphere in the Kremlin.” Gorodetsky,
93. Hillgruber,
94. Hitler had expected Britain, as he told one of his top military men already back on June 23, 1940, to “knuckle under,” conceding Germany’s free hand on the continent. Förster, “Hitler Turns East,” 117 (citing Notizen des Wehrmachtsführungsamtes, BA-MA, RW 4/v. 581).
95. Hitler had also misunderstood British anti-Communism. The phlegmatic British had always been interested only in containment, not an anti-Bolshevik crusade, since the latter, even if successful, would just bring Nazi domination of the continent, so London took a similar approach to Moscow as to Berlin: engagement to try to “moderate” the regime. Waddington, “Idyllis and Unruffled Atmosphere.”
96. Hubatsch,
97. Overy,
98. To carry the consequences to their conclusion: Hitler would have either gone on to conquer the USSR, or been vanquished by the latter, which could have enveloped all of Europe. Catherwood,
99. Schramm,
100. “The analyst can choose which problem he wishes to study, whereas the statesman’s problems are imposed on him,” Kissinger wrote. “The analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the overwhelming challenge to the statesman is the pressure of time. The analyst runs no risk. If his conclusions prove wrong, he can write another treatise. The statesman is permitted only one guess; his mistakes are irretrievable.” Kissinger,
101. Gerwarth,
102. Speer,
BIBLIOGRAPHY
APRF: Russian Presidential Archive (former politburo archive)
AVPRF: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation