The year 1925 brought the disputes in the Politburo to a head. Personal bickering became all-out factional conflict as Zinoviev and Kamenev moved into open opposition to Bukharin and Stalin. They wrangled over the party’s internal organisation as well as over international relations. Official agrarian measures were also highly controversial. Bukharin in his enthusiasm for the New Economic Policy had said to the more affluent peasants: ‘Enrich yourselves!’1 This hardly coincided with Lenin’s comments on kulaks over the years. Even in his last dictated articles Lenin had envisaged a steady movement by the peasantry towards a system of farming co-ops; he had never expressly advocated the profit motive as the motor of agricultural regeneration. Stalin’s ally Bukharin appeared to be undermining basic Leninist ideas, and Zinoviev and Kamenev were not just being opportunistic in castigating this. They generally objected to the growing compromises of the New Economic Policy as it had been developed. Stalin and Bukharin stuck together to see off their factional adversaries. Having fought against Trotski and the Left Opposition, they battled against Zinoviev and Kamenev when they called for a more radical interpretation of the ‘union of the working class with the peasantry’. The survival of the NEP was at stake.

Clashes occurred at the Central Committee in October 1925. Zinoviev and Kamenev had arrived with assurances of support from Grigori Sokolnikov, the People’s Commissar of Finances, and Lenin’s widow Nadezhda Krupskaya. Stalin and Bukharin carried the majority on that occasion. But neither Zinoviev nor Kamenev had lost their following at the party’s highest level. Stalin therefore decided to attack them openly at the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925. He did this deftly by revealing that they had once tried to get him to agree to Trotski’s expulsion from the party. Sanctimoniously disclaiming his own propensity for butchery, Stalin announced:2

We are for unity, we’re against chopping. The policy of chopping is repugnant to us. The party wants unity, and it will achieve this together with comrades Kamenev and Zinoviev if this is what they want — and without them if they don’t want it.

Although his own personality had been criticised by Lenin as crude and divisive, he contrived to suggest that the menace of a party split was embodied by what was becoming known as the Leningrad Opposition.

Kamenev put things starkly:3

We’re against creating a theory of ‘the Leader’ [vozhdya]; we’re against making anyone into ‘the Leader’. We’re against the Secretariat, by actually combining politics and organisation, standing above the political body. We’re for the idea of our leadership being internally organised in such a fashion that there should exist a truly omnipotent Politburo uniting all our party’s politicians as well as that the Secretariat should be subordinate to it and technically carrying out its decrees… Personally I suggest that our General Secretary is not the kind of figure who can unite the old Bolshevik high command around him. It is precisely because I’ve often said this personally to comrade Stalin and precisely because I’ve often said this to a group of Leninist comrades that I repeat it at the Congress: I have come to the conclusion that comrade Stalin is incapable of performing the role of unifier of the Bolshevik high command.

This warning appeared extravagant to the supporters of Stalin and Bukharin. But Kamenev had a point. He understood that, beneath the surface of amity between Stalin and Bukharin, Stalin aspired to become the party’s unrivalled leader.

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