The atmosphere of a political witch-hunt was thickening. Nikolai Bauman was sacked from the Central Committee Secretariat for being mildly conciliatory to the former members of the United Opposition. Stalin, Molotov and Kaganovich were edgy. Their policies involved a huge gamble. In seeking to consolidate the regime and to deepen the Revolution they were attacking a wide front of enemies in politics, the economy and society. This required the vigorous deployment of party, armed forces and the OGPU. The leaders of these institutions had to be trustworthy. Each institution had to be strengthened in personnel and material resources to carry out its tasks. But, as the state’s power was increased, the danger arose that such leaders had a growing capacity to undermine the Politburo. Lukewarm followers were of no use to Stalin. Unequivocal support alone would do.
The firmness shown by Stalin in 1930–1 failed to discourage confidential criticism in the upper echelons of the party. Although the Syrtsov-Lominadze group had been broken up, other little groupings sprouted up. One consisted of Nikolai Eismont, Vladimir Tolmachev and A. P. Smirnov. Denounced by informers in November 1932 and interrogated by the OGPU, they confessed to verbal disloyalty. But this was not enough for Stalin. The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in January 1933 condemned the leaders for having formed an ‘anti-party grouping’ and took the opportunity to reprimand Rykov and Tomski for maintaining contact with ‘anti-party elements’.30 Yet no sooner had one grouping been dealt with than another was discovered. Martemyan Ryutin, a Moscow district party functionary, hated Stalin’s personal dictatorship. He and several like-minded friends gathered in their homes for evening discussions and Ryutin produced a pamphlet demanding Stalin’s removal from office. Ryutin was arrested. Stalin, interpreting the pamphlet as a call for an assassination attempt, urged Ryutin’s execution. In the end he was sentenced to ten years in the Gulag.31
Stalin never forgot a slight or missed a chance to hit back. He would wait as long as necessary to take his chance. Every tall tree he chopped down satiated an ego which had been injured by years of underappreciation and mockery. His memory was extraordinary, and he had his future victims marked down in a very long list. He extended his distrust to his allies and subordinates. Stalin demanded total loyalty. His daughter Svetlana, writing a reverential memoir in 1967, recalled:32
If he cast out of his heart someone who had been known to him for a long time and if in his soul he had already translated that person into the ranks of ‘enemies’, it was impossible to hold a conversation with him about that person.
This was his way. Once an enemy always an enemy! And even if he was compelled for internal party reasons to show mercy, he always intended to slake his thirst for vengeance in due course.
Bukharin belatedly appreciated this. Until 1928 he had been content to have his rough, aggressive comrade at his side. When he fell out with Stalin, he knew it would be hard to get back into his favour. Still he went on trying to arrange his readmission to public life. He wrote pleading letters to Stalin. He continued to visit and stay in Stalin’s dacha at Zubalovo, talking at length with Nadya Allilueva and playing with their children. Foolishly, however, he went on blabbing about his genuine opinions to other oppositionist leaders. He sometimes did this on the telephone. Little did he suspect that the OGPU provided Stalin with transcripts of its phone-taps. Bukharin, Kamenev and Zinoviev were providing material which would make Stalin’s ultimate retaliation truly terrible. He knew their flattery and obeisance were insincere.
