Japan, Germany, and Italy, on September 27, 1940, signed a Tripartite Pact in the Reich Chancellery. The three Axis signatories delineated spheres of influence and pledged for the next ten years “to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked.” This represented a turnabout for Japan. Pro-German circles in Tokyo had been systematically removed from influential posts, thanks to Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, but with the defeat of France, the Japanese hoped to use German victories in the west to expand southward in French Indochina, which would require deterrence of the United States.189 “The basic aim of the pact is to avoid war with the United States,” Prime Minister Konoe told the cabinet. “However, I think it is necessary for us to display firmness, because if we act humbly, it will only make the United States presumptuous.”190 Perhaps there was also anticipation of some spoils from a British surrender to Germany. Hitler saw Japan’s enthusiasm as an attempt “to cash in” on Germany’s victories by offering to serve as “harvest helpers.”191 But following the debacle of the air campaign against Britain, the Führer had come around to seeking to deter U.S. support for Britain by wielding the Japanese cudgel.192
The agreement still fell short of a binding military alliance. It also specifically excluded the Soviet Union as a target. “Its exclusive purpose,” Ribbentrop informed Molotov, two days before the scheduled signing, “is to bring the elements pressing for America’s entry into the war to their senses.”193 When Weizsäcker briefed the Soviet ambassador in Berlin on September 28, he underlined the desire on the part of the three signatories for better relations with the USSR.194 “Exceptional significance,” noted Comintern chief Dimitrov in his diary for September 28. “Further expansion of the war to world-war dimensions.”195 An unsigned front-page analysis in
Japanese ruling circles now hoped for improved relations with the USSR, to secure the country’s northern flank and increase the pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to capitulate. Secretly, on October 3, 1940, Japanese and Soviet negotiators were working on a draft nonaggression pact and preliminarily agreed that “the USSR will abandon its support for Chiang and will repress the Chinese Communist party’s anti-Japanese activities; in exchange, Japan recognizes and accepts that the Chinese Communist party will retain as a base the three northwest provinces (Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia).” Negotiators further agreed that the Soviets would acquiesce in any Japanese moves in Indochina, and Japan would not oppose any future Soviet moves in Afghanistan.197
The fly in the ointment remained German troops in the east. Golikov had reported (October 2) that the Germans were moving many of the troops from within East Prussia and the General Gouvernement closer to the Soviet border. Stalin’s NKVD station chief in Bulgaria secretly reported the shipment of German heavy armaments on barges along the Danube to the Black Sea, right on the Soviet doorstep. But Soviet intelligence adhered to the line that the sharp troop buildup reflected only the unavoidable necessity of moving troops out of France, given the anti-German attitudes prevalent in conquered France. Still, analysts also mentioned Germany’s desire to strengthen its influence in Eastern Europe, especially the Balkans.198
HITLER’S LATIN FRUSTRATIONS AND BALKAN AMBITIONS
Schulenburg was in Berlin in late September, trying to put relations with Moscow back on track by encouraging a German invitation for a state visit.199 Ribbentrop had never abandoned his efforts to restore friendly bilateral relations by inviting Molotov, or even Stalin, to Berlin. The Germans, like the British, mistakenly believed that Molotov had never been out of the country (he had visited fascist Italy in 1922), but they nonetheless believed he would reciprocate the German foreign minister’s two visits to Moscow.200 Ribbentrop let the count know that a new invitation to Molotov was in the works. This hoped-for meeting was predicated on a vast European-Asian bloc directed against the British, Ribbentrop’s dream castle.201
