As Molotov stepped off the train in Berlin, there were puddles everywhere. The greeting party included Ribbentrop, Keitel, Robert Ley (German Labor Front), and Himmler, but not the staunch ideologues Goebbels and Rosenberg. Molotov would be in the Nazi capital for forty-eight hours, accompanied by a sixty-five-person entourage, including Dekanozov (foreign affairs), Tevosyan (ferrous metallurgy), Yakovlev (aviation), and Alexei Krutikov (foreign trade), who would remain in-country for industrial and trade matters. Merkulov (NKVD) supervised sixteen “security” guards tasked with maintaining surveillance of the Soviet delegation (and, the Gestapo suspected, leaving agents behind).256 After an inspection of the honor guard, the Soviets departed the station in a sixty-vehicle convoy. “There was almost no one . . . along the streets,” according to an American correspondent.257 They arrived at the refurbished Schloss Bellevue, a former neoclassical Hohenzollern palace of more than 130 rooms set amid the exotic plants of the Tiergarten. Scented roses filled the opulent rooms and, as at the train station, the hammer-and-sickle flag flew alongside the swastika banner.258 After breakfast, cigars, and cognac, the Soviets were taken to the foreign ministry. Only Molotov and Dekanozov, with interpreters and notetakers, were received. “A luxurious study, perhaps somewhat smaller than Hitler’s own,” the Soviet interpreter Berezhkov recalled of Ribbentrop’s office, some of whose furnishings might have been trophies looted from the Low Countries and France. “Antique gilded furniture. Tapestry covers the walls from floor to ceiling, pictures hanging in heavy frames, porcelain and bronze statues on high stands placed in the corners.”259
A genial Ribbentrop pontificated at length about a division of the world, but he refrained from making concrete proposals. “Germany has already won the war,” he crowed. “No state in the world could alter the situation created as a result of Germany’s victories.”260 Molotov, demanding specifics, managed to get a few words in. Following a white-gloved lunch back at the Bellevue, the foreign affairs commissar was brought to Hitler’s grandiose new Chancellery, in an elaborately choreographed entrance designed to awe. The Führer, in a “study” the size of a congress hall, greeted the Soviet representative with the Nazi upturned palm. Invited to sit on a sofa, Molotov, who wore a rimless pince-nez and generally favored gray suits and stiff-necked white collars, was deemed by the Germans to resemble a mathematics professor. Hitler, described by an aide as “surprisingly gracious and friendly,” delivered a long monologue from his armchair. He expounded on how Germany had been compelled to “penetrate into territories remote from her,” to secure vital raw materials or prevent Britain from establishing a toehold, and acknowledged that “possibly M. Molotov was of the opinion that in one case or another there had been a departure from the conception of spheres of influence which had been agreed.” He also asserted that “as soon as atmospheric conditions improved, Germany would be poised for a great and final blow against England.” Molotov was not awed. No sooner had the monologue finished, recalled the German interpreter, than “the questions hailed down upon Hitler.”261
The Hammer made no effort to be ingratiating (not part of his skill set anyway). His top aide had told another member of the delegation, General Alexander Vasilevsky, first deputy chief of the general staff operations directorate (responsible for battle plans), that the aims of the Berlin visit were “to determine the further intentions of Hitler, and as much as possible to delay a German aggression.”262 Whereas Hitler spoke of Soviet interests in British imperial lands (which Britain still controlled), Molotov spoke of Soviet security interests up and down Eastern Europe (which Hitler eyed). Molotov stated that Stalin had given him exact instructions, enumerated the mutual benefits of the Pact, and demanded to know “What was the meaning of the New Order in Europe and in Asia, and what role would the USSR be given in it?”263 He insisted that “precision is necessary in a delimitation of spheres of influence,” and “particular vigilance is needed in the delimitation of spheres of influence between Germany and Russia.”264
