German counterintelligence had little sense of the true depth and breadth of Soviet intelligence penetration. But a buildup of the scope necessary to launch a monumental war against the USSR—construction of rail lines, roads, aerodromes, barracks; movement and storage of armaments, gasoline, troops—could never be concealed in any case. The tanks and building materials had to be carried on flat cars. The key, however, was not Germany’s war preparations—which, as British intelligence noted (January 31), were almost open—but Hitler’s intentions.74 Here, the high command and the SS’s intelligence arm, the SD, engaged in a brilliant game of judo, using the power of Communism’s nonpareil spy networks against the USSR by pumping them with disinformation.75 Stalin did not have an agent in Hitler’s innermost circle or personal staff who could have exposed the campaign of plausible falsehoods.
The forces being stationed along the Soviet frontier could be used against not just the USSR but also British possessions and clients. Back in July 1940, Hitler had told top generals that the buildup in the east would be passed off as training for a cross-Channel invasion of Britain, a story fed to lower-level German military commanders as well as foreign embassy staff. Plans were drawn up for the rapid movement of these troops westward, with false orders to prepare plans for travel. Detailed maps of Britain were supplied to the eastern units’ commanders and intelligence officers. English interpreters were assigned to the German units on the Soviet border. The falsehoods confused Germany’s own military at various levels. Once Hitler had postponed Sea Lion, in September 1940, a second rationale was put into play: preparation for an attack on British interests in the Balkans (Greece), the Mediterranean (Cyprus, Malta, Gibraltar), and the Near East (Egypt, Iraq, Palestine). Some top British intelligence officers had interpreted Germany’s entry into Romania (October 1940) precisely along these lines. The Germans demonstrably increased their intelligence gathering in the Near East, activity that was duly picked up by the British and made its way to Moscow.76
Just such a “peripheral” strategy against Britain, originally invented by Jodl, was actually favored by some members of the Nazi hierarchy, such as Admiral Raeder and Ribbentrop, and by Mussolini, and throughout the spring of 1941 it retained its plausibility.77 At the same time, a third, even more plausible rationale for the massive German troop concentrations in Eastern Europe was disseminated: that Hitler was going to use the buildup to intimidate Stalin into yielding territory. Stories of German supply shortages—which were real—encouraged the view that the Führer would demand “concessions.” Stalin began to get reports that the German troop buildup was prelude to an “ultimatum.” The ruse, which appears to have entered the Soviet intelligence bloodstream from Kobulov via “Lycée-ist,” soon reached the despot from so many sources, so far and wide, that it came to seem an article of faith. After all, it comported with Hitler’s modus operandi. It did seem to explain the buildup on the Soviet border (whose exact dimensions remained a matter of guesswork and dispute).78 And the idea of an unprovoked war against the colossal Red Army was so preposterous that a giant bluff seemed more likely.79
To believe—as Barbarossa secretly stipulated—that the troops were being positioned to launch a surprise attack against the USSR even before Britain had been defeated meant believing that Hitler would voluntarily open a second front. But as we saw, beginning with the December 14 message from “Lycée-ist,” Germany’s disinformation operation circulated statements attributed to the high command or Hitler himself that a two-front war against Britain and the USSR was impossible, suicidal.80 In fact, Hitler reasoned that the only way to
WARNINGS INTENSIFY
