Stalin was the only one in the Soviet regime to receive the full gamut of intelligence reports, but even he did not see everything. In the first half of 1941, Soviet military intelligence would receive 267 reports from its agents abroad and convey 129 of these to the military and political leadership.109 (Beria at civilian intelligence might have been an even more consequential filter.) Functionaries in despotic systems often shrink from supplying the despot with information they know he will not welcome.110 After the terror, it took special courage or naïveté to bring Stalin news he did not want to hear.111 On March 20, 1941, Golikov sent him one of the first systematic summaries by Soviet intelligence, this one concerning German forces and their dislocation. Tupikov, in Berlin, had produced a 100-page overview of Germany’s military.112 Golikov’s summary conveyed Tupikov’s analysis of a large concentration of German forces near the frontier and concluded that, “according to the report of our military attaché in Berlin, we can expect the onset of military action against the USSR between May 15 and June 15.”
Knowing the despot’s beliefs firsthand, Golikov walked a fine line, writing that an attack would likely come “after victory over England or after the conclusion with her of an honorable peace for Germany.” He also wrote that “the majority of the espionage material concerning the possibilities of war with the USSR in the spring of 1941 emanates from Anglo-American sources whose aim today is doubtless to endeavor to worsen relations between the USSR and Germany.” Nonetheless, Golikov added, “considering the origins and development of fascism, and its aims—implementing the plans of Hitler that were laid out in full and flowery [exposition] in his book
While Pavel Fitin, of NKGB civilian intelligence, had no access to Stalin, reporting instead to Beria and Merkulov, Golikov did have to face the despot occasionally.114 All five of Golikov’s immediate predecessors had been executed. His March 20, 1941, summary, mangled with caveats, nonetheless constituted a bold step. But then, in his conclusion, Golikov repudiated his report’s vital content: “The rumors and documents attesting to the inevitability of war against the USSR this spring need to be assessed as disinformation coming from English and even perhaps German intelligence.”115
German planes were crossing Soviet frontiers at altitudes of seven miles, out of artillery range but perfect for photographing Soviet military installations and deployments. When confronted about their violations of Soviet airspace, the Germans would point to their military schools near the border and assert that trainee pilots were losing their way. “Elder,” in Göring’s air ministry, provided unique information, however, which the Berlin NKGB (March 24) reported to Moscow, about intensive compilations of Soviet targets, including bridges to cut the movement of reserves. “Photographs of Soviet cities and other objects are regularly coming into aviation HQ,” the report stated, and the German military attaché in Moscow was traveling around by car to verify the locations of Soviet electrical stations for bombing. “Officers at HQ have formed the opinion that military action against the USSR has been set for the end of April or early May. These dates are connected to a German intention to secure the harvest for themselves, calculating that Soviet forces under retreat will not be able to burn the green wheat.”116
Around this time, a German printer evidently provided the Soviet embassy in Berlin with a book, scheduled for a massive print run, with Latin transliterations of Russian phrases: “Where is the chairman of the collective farm?” “Are you a Communist?” “Hands up!”117
