114. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 740, l. 5.
115. Danilov and Khlevniuk, Kak lomali NEP, V: 141 (Syrtsov). Officially, 19.1 percent of households had been collectivized in the North Caucasus by Oct. 1929. Davies, Socialist Offensive, 442.
116. Pravda, Nov. 26, 1929; Cohen, Bukharin, 334–5; Davies, Socialist Offensive, 174; Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, 369.
117. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 778, l. 23. Hryhory Petrovsky, a Stalin loyalist, stated at the plenum that “[I] did not belong to the ‘rightist baiters’ in the way, for example, I fought with the Trotskyites or the new opposition—Kamenev and Zinoviev—when we went wall to wall.”
118. VKP (b) v rezoliutsiiakh (1933), II; KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh (7th ed.), II: 631. During the plenum, Stalin angrily challenged a published account by Volodomyr Zatonsky concerning Lenin’s dealings with the Left SRs. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 735, l. 11–3, 15–7; Zatonskii, “Otryvki vospominanii,” 128–41. See also Zelenov, “Partiinyi kontrol’ za izdaniem sochinenii Lenina.”
119. Danilov and Ivnitskii, Dokumenty svidetel’stvuiut, 23. See also Avtorkhanov, Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party, 159–60.
120. Davies, Socialist Offensive, 157–74; KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh (7th ed.), II: 643.
121. The CER linked the Soviet cities of Chita and Vladivostok as well as the Chinese cities of Manzhouli, Harbin, Tsitsihar, and Suifenho. Tang, Russian Policy, 193–241. In the Soviet consulate the Chinese found high-quality imitations of American and Japanese seals, evidently used to reseal letters that had been perlustrated and to mail secret Soviet correspondence under the guise of American or Japanese packages. Lensen, Damned Inheritance, 34 (citing FRUS, 1929, II: 196–7; FO, 317/13931–F2692, F-2960).
122. Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, III/iii: 895–910. Relations were severed on Aug. 16, 1929. Kārlis Baumanis boasted to the Moscow province party conference (Sept. 1929) that the “Chinese aggression had woken up [Soviet] workers,” who pledged their readiness to take up arms rather than “surrender to the imperialists.” Pervaia moskovskaia konferentsiia VKP (b): stenpograficheskii otchet, 39, 42.
123. Sovetsko-kitaiskii konflikt 1929, 37, translated in Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, II: 391; Krasnoznamenyi Dal’nevostochnyi, 91; Slavinskii, Sovetskii Soiuz i Kitai, 176.
124. Stalin had asked Molotov to think about staging a revolutionary uprising to invade and occupy Harbin “and establish a revolutionary power (massacre the landlords, bring in the peasants, create soviets in the cities and towns).” Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 167–8 (Oct. 7, 1929); Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 182.
125. Litvinov, Notes for a Journal, 113; Stephan, Russian Far East, 182. Soviet military intelligence had surmised in spring 1929 in an internal memorandum that “despite the strengthening activeness of anti-Soviet and fascist elements in Japan, Japanese policy regarding the USSR has had a more or less steady character.” Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, VII/i: 29–31.
126. Krivosheev, Grif sekretnosti sniat, 66.
127. Slavinskii, Sovetskii Soiuz i Kitai, 178–81; Erickson, Soviet High Command, 240–4; Dushen’kin, Proletarskii marshal, 98–100; Krasnoznamenyi Dal’nevostochnyi, 115–24. Blyukher was awarded a Buick automobile and use of the former Chinese consulate in Khabarovsk as his residence. Kondrat’ev, Marshal Bliukher, 271–3; Kartunova, Bliukher v Kitae, 12; Blyukher, “Vospominania o lichnom,” 81, 85.
128. Walker, War Nobody Knew, 328 (citing North China Daily News, Nov. 28, 1929), 334–5.
129. Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, II: 434–6; Antonov, “Nekotorye itogi konflikta”; Tang, Russian Policy, 242–67; Chuikov, “Konflikt na KVZhD.” See also Elleman, Emergence of Communist Power, 192–205; and Patrikeef, Russian Politics, 85.
130. The Japanese also noted the apparent indifference of the League of Nations to questions of Chinese sovereignty. Lensen, Damned Inheritance.
