Well, Mr. Frankel, who started this program, began to suffer from the computer disease that anybody who works with computers now knows about. It’s a very serious disease and it interferes completely with the work. The trouble with computers is you play with them. They are so wonderful. You have these switches—if it’s an even number you do this, if it’s an odd number you do that—and pretty soon you can do more and more elaborate things if you are clever enough, on one machine.

After a while the whole system broke down. Frankel wasn’t paying any attention; he wasn’t supervising anybody. The system was going very, very slowly—while he was sitting in a room figuring out how to make one tabulator automatically print arc-tangent X, and then it would start and it would print columns and then bitsi, bitsi, bitsi, and calculate the arc-tangent automatically by integrating as it went along and make a whole table in one operation.

Absolutely useless. We had tables of arc-tangents. But if you’ve ever worked with computers, you understand the disease—the delight in being able to see how much you can do. But he got the disease for the first time, the poor fellow who invented the thing.

I was asked to stop working on the stuff I was doing in my group and go down and take over the IBM group, and I tried to avoid the disease. And, although they had done only three problems in nine months, I had a very good group.

The real trouble was that no one had ever told these fellows anything. The army had selected them from all over the country for a thing called Special Engineer Detachment—clever boys from high school who had engineering ability. They sent them up to Los Alamos. They put them in barracks. And they would tell them nothing.

Then they came to work, and what they had to do was work on IBM machines—punching holes, numbers that they didn’t understand. Nobody told them what it was. The thing was going very slowly. I said that the first thing there has to be is that these technical guys know what we’re doing. Oppenheimer went and talked to the security and got special permission so I could give a nice lecture about what we were doing, and they were all excited: “We’re fighting a war! We see what it is!” They knew what the numbers meant. If the pressure came out higher, that meant there was more energy released, and so on and so on. They knew what they were doing.

Complete transformation! They began to invent ways of doing it better. They improved the scheme. They worked at night. They didn’t need supervising in the night; they didn’t need anything. They understood everything; they invented several of the programs that we used.

So my boys really came through, and all that had to be done was to tell them what it was. As a result, although it took them nine months to do three problems before, we did nine problems in three months, which is nearly ten times as fast.

But one of the secret ways we did our problems was this. The problems consisted of a hunch of cards that had to go through a cycle. First add, then multiply—and so it went through the cycle of machines in this room, slowly, as it went around and around. So we figured a way to put a different colored set of cards through a cycle too, but out of phase. We’d do two or three problems at a time.

But this got us into another problem. Near the end of the war, for instance, just before we had to make a test in Albuquerque, the question was: How much energy would be released? We had been calculating the release from various designs, but we hadn’t computed for the specific design that was ultimately used. So Bob Christy came down and said, “We would like the results for how this thing is going to work in one month”—or some very short time, like three weeks.

I said, “It’s impossible.”

He said, “Look, you’re putting out nearly two problems a month. It takes only two weeks per problem, or three weeks per problem.”

I said, “I know. It really takes much longer to do the problem, but we’re doing them in parallel. As they go through, it takes a long time and there’s no way to make it go around faster.”

He went out, and I began to think. Is there a way to make it go around faster? What if we did nothing else on the machine, so nothing else was interfering? I put a challenge to the boys on the blackboard—CAN WE DO IT? They all start yelling, “Yes, we’ll work double shifts, we’ll work overtime,” all this kind of thing. “We’ll try it. We’ll try it!”

And so the rule was: All other problems out. Only one problem and just concentrate on this one. So they started to work.

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