On 19 October the Turkish ultimatum expired. Against the advice of the British and the French, who tried to hold them back, the Turks went on the attack in the principalities, calculating that the Western press would drum up public support for their cause against Russia. The Turkish government was very conscious of the power of the British press in particular, perhaps even thinking that it was the same as the government, and tried very hard to win it over to its side. Throughout the autumn of 1853 the Porte directed considerable funds to its London embassy so that it could ‘pay for and organize in secret a series of public demonstrations and newspaper articles’ calling on the British government to intervene against Russia.2
Ordered by the Porte to commence hostilities, on 23 October Omer Pasha’s forces crossed the Danube at Kalafat and took the town from the Cossacks in the first skirmish of the war. The villagers of the Kalafat region – an anti-Russian stronghold of the 1848 Wallachian revolution – armed themselves with hunting guns and joined the fight against the Cossack troops. The Turks also crossed the river at Oltenitsa, where they engaged in heavier but indecisive fighting with the Russians, both sides claiming victory.3
These initial skirmishes made up the Tsar’s mind to launch a major offensive against the Turks, as he had outlined in his letter to Paskevich on 29 May. But his chief commander had become even more opposed to the idea than he had been in the spring. Paskevich thought the Turks too strong and the Western fleets too close for the Russians to attack the Turkish capital. On 24 September he had sent a memo to the Tsar, urging him to adopt a more defensive position on the northern side of the Danube, while organizing Christian militias to rise up against the Turks south of the river. His aim was to pressure the Turks into making concessions to Russia without the need to fight a war. ‘We have the most deadly weapon to use against the Ottoman Empire,’ Paskevich wrote. ‘Its success cannot even be prevented by the Western powers. Our most terrifying weapon is our influence among our Christian tribes in Turkey.’
Paskevich was mainly worried that the Austrians would oppose a Russian offensive in the Balkans, where they were vulnerable to Slav uprisings in their own neighbouring territories. He did not want to commit Russian troops to battle with the Turks if they might be needed against an attack by the Austrians, most likely in Poland, whose loss might lead to the collapse of the Russian Empire in Europe. Paskevich lacked the courage to confront the Tsar. So instead he dragged his heels, ignoring orders to advance south as soon as possible and concentrating instead on the consolidation of the Russian positions along the Danube. His aim was twofold: to turn the river into a supply line from the Black Sea into the Balkans, and to organize the Christians into militias in preparation for a future offensive against the Turks, perhaps in the spring of 1854. ‘The idea is new and beautiful,’ Paskevich wrote. ‘It will bring us into close relations with the most belligerent tribes of Turkey: the Serbs, Herzegovians, Montenegrins and Bulgarians, who, if not for us, are at least against the Turks, and who with some help from our side may indeed destroy the Turkish empire … without loss of Russian blood.’4 Aware that it went against the legitimist principles of the Tsar to stir revolts in foreign lands, Paskevich defended his idea on religious grounds – the protection of the Orthodox from Muslim persecution – and cited precedents from previous wars with Turkey (in 1773–4, 1788–91 and 1806–12) when the Russian army had raised Christian troops in Ottoman territories.5
The Tsar did not need much convincing. In a revealing memorandum written at the start of November 1853, Nicholas outlined his strategy for the war against Turkey. Circulated to his ministers and senior commanders, the memorandum was clearly influenced by Paskevich, his most trusted general. The Tsar was counting on the Serbs to rebel against the Turks, followed sometime later by the Bulgarians. The Russian army would consolidate a defensive position on the Danube and then move further south to liberate the Christians when they rose against the Turks. The strategy depended on the long-term occupation of the principalities to give the Russians time to organize the Christians into militias. The Tsar looked ahead at least a year:
The beginning of 1855 will show us how much hope we can place on the Christians of Turkey and whether England and France will remain opposed to us. There is no other way for us to move ahead, except through a popular uprising (
