The Russian Revolution полностью

With her lack of knowledge of politics and economics, Alexandra concentrated on personalities. In her view, placing in authority individuals of proven loyalty to the dynasty was the surest way of preserving the country and the Crown, between which she drew no clear distinction. With her encouragement, Nicholas carried out purges of high officials, usually replacing them with incompetents whose principal qualification was devotion to him and his wife. This “ministerial leapfrog,” as it came to be known, not only removed able and patriotic functionaries but disorganized the entire bureaucracy by making it impossible for ministers to remain in office long enough to master their responsibilities.

The dismissal in September 1915 of three ministers who had opposed Nicholas’s decision to go to the front has already been mentioned. In January 1916, Goremykin was let go. This step was taken, not in response to the almost universal clamor from both bureaucracy and parliament, but from a fear that he would be unable to cope with the Duma, which was scheduled to reconvene for a brief session in February. He was not only seventy-seven years old but, judging from his testimony the following year to a commission of inquiry, also in an advanced stage of senility. Worried about the Duma, Nicholas wanted as chief of cabinet a more competent and forceful personality. Goremykin wished to limit Duma debates to purely budgetary matters, which the Tsar thought unrealistic.²³ He was replaced by Boris Stürmer (Shtiurmer), a sixty-eight-year-old bureaucrat with a background of service as governor and member of the State Council. Although Nicholas believed that Stürmer would get along with the Duma, this was not to be. He was a dyed-in-the-wool monarchist who had once been close to Plehve and was chiefly remembered for manhandling the Tver zemstvo. He also had a reputation for servility and corruption. The appointment to the highest administrative post of a man with a German surname at a time when anti-German feelings ran high testified to the insensitivity of the Court. But Stürmer was loyal and close to Rasputin.

27. Alexandra Fedorovna and her confidante, Anna Vyrubova.

Few regretted Goremykin’s departure, but the dismissals which followed were badly received. On March 13, 1916, Polivanov was let go. His splendid work in restoring the fighting capacity of the Russian armies did not save him: he was politically quite unacceptable. In the letter in which he informed Polivanov of his dismissal, Nicholas gave as the reason the minister’s insufficient “control” of the Military-Industrial Committees.²⁴ This was a polite way of expressing displeasure with Polivanov’s closeness to Guchkov, the chairman of these committees, and through him to the business community. The authorities were especially chagrined that Guchkov had invited worker representatives to the Central Military-Industrial Committee: Alexander Protopopov, the Minister of the Interior, told Knox that the committee was a “dangerous syndicalist society.”²⁵ Such was the reward given a man whom no less an authority than Hindenburg credited with having saved the Russian army.* Polivanov was replaced, again on Rasputin’s recommendation, by the decent but unqualified General Dmitrii Shuvaev. A specialist in military logistics, with particular expertise in footwear, he had neither combat nor command experience. (“They said about him,” according to one contemporary, “that in every question which he discussed he invariably turned to that of boots.”²⁶) He had the advantage of being untainted by any political connections. He was also mindlessly devoted to the Imperial couple and was their “Friend”: he once told Colonel Knox, with tears in his eyes, that if the Tsar ordered him to jump from the window he would gladly do so.²⁷ Since jumping out of windows was not part of his duties, the poor man found himself swamped by responsibilities beyond his capacity to manage. He had no illusions about his merits. When the public began to complain of “treason in high places,” he is said to have exclaimed indignantly: “I may be a fool, but I am no traitor!” (“Ia byt’ mozhet durak, no ia ne izmennik”)—a bon mot that was to provide the rhetorical theme for Miliukov’s Duma address of November 1, 1916.

The next to go was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The ostensible reason for Sazonov’s dismissal was advocacy of Polish autonomy; the real one was contact with oppositional circles. His departure was badly received in London and Paris, where he was known as a reliable friend of the alliance. Stürmer took over Sazonov’s post, adding the Foreign Ministry portfolio to that of Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior—a heavy load indeed.