The Russian Revolution полностью

When he arrived in Pskov on March 1, Nicholas had no thought of abdicating. On the contrary, he was determined to reassert his authority by force; in his diary the preceding day he noted that he had sent General Ivanov to Petrograd “to introduce [vodvorit’] order.” But in Pskov he fell under the influence of opinions which touched him where he was the most sensitive: his patriotism and love of the army. From a conversation with General Ruzskii shortly after arrival and throughout the twenty-four hours that followed, Nicholas heard from everyone that as long as he remained tsar Russia could not win the war. Nicholas discounted the opinion of politicians as self-serving, but he paid heed to the generals. As the Hughes telegraph at the Northern Front headquarters registered telegram after telegram from the military commanders urging him, for the sake of the country and its armed forces, first to allow the Duma to form the cabinet and then to abdicate, his resolve weakened. Alexandra anticipated the effects of such pressures on him and on March 2 urged him not to sign a “constitution” or some such “horror” (uzhas). She added:

If you are compelled to make concessions, then you are under no conditions obliged to fulfill them, because they have been extracted in an unworthy manner.¹⁰⁷

General Alekseev, who in the Tsar’s absence from Mogilev assumed the duties of Commander in Chief, had sound practical reasons to be worried by the news from Petrograd: the continuation of strikes and mutinies in the capital city threatened to disrupt the railway service and halt the flow of supplies to the front.¹⁰⁸ In the longer run there was the danger of the mutiny spreading to front-line troops. In the morning of February 28 he concluded that there was no hope of suppressing the Petrograd mutiny by force because Khabalov had wired that he had only 1,100 loyal troops left and even they were running out of ammunition.¹⁰⁹ In these circumstances he saw no way of saving the front from collapse other than by granting the political concessions urged by Rodzianko. Having learned of the spread of disorders to Moscow, on March 1 he cabled the Tsar:

A revolution in Russia—and this is inevitable once disorders occur in the rear—will mean a disgraceful termination of the war, with all its inevitable consequences, so dire for Russia. The army is most intimately connected with the life of the rear. It may be confidently stated that disorders in the rear will produce the same result among the armed forces. It is impossible to ask the army calmly to wage war while a revolution is in progress in the rear. The youthful makeup of the present army and its officer staff, among whom a very high percentage consist of reservists and commissioned university students, gives no grounds for assuming that the army will not react to events occurring in Russia.

Insofar as the Duma was trying to restore order in the rear, Alekseev continued, it should be given the opportunity to form a cabinet of national confidence.¹¹⁰ He followed this cable with the draft of a manifesto prepared, at his request, by N. A. Basily, the chief of the diplomatic chancellery at headquarters,¹¹¹ in which Nicholas empowered the Duma to form a cabinet. Alekseev’s recommendation was endorsed by Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich, the Inspector of Artillery and the Tsar’s cousin once removed.

Around 10 p.m., while these messages were en route, Nicholas received General Ruzskii. In response to the Tsar’s request that he give free expression to his opinions, Ruzskii came out in support of a Duma cabinet. Having heard him out, Nicholas explained why he disagreed. As Ruzskii later recounted:

The sovereign’s basic thought was that he wished nothing for himself, in his own interest, that he held on to nothing, but that he did not feel he had the right to transfer the entire task of administering Russia into the hands of people who, being in power today, could inflict grievous harm on the fatherland and tomorrow wash their hands, “handing in their resignation.” “I am accountable to God and Russia for all that has happened and will happen,” the sovereign said. “It is a matter of no consequence that the ministers will be responsible to the Duma and State Council. If I see that they are not acting for Russia’s good, I will never be able to agree with them, consoling myself with the thought that this is not the work of my hands, not my responsibility.”

When Ruzskii urged the Tsar to adopt the formula “The sovereign reigns and the government rules,” Nicholas said that