The Russian Revolution полностью

The following night (October 21–22), a deputation from the Milrevkom appeared at the headquarters of the Military Staff. Its spokesman, the Bolshevik Lieutenant Dashkevich, informed the commander of the Petrograd Military District, Colonel G. P. Polkovnikov, that by authority of the garrison meeting the staffs orders to the garrison would henceforth acquire force only if countersigned by the Milrevkom. The troops, of course, had made no such decision, and even if they had, it would have had no validity: the deputation actually acted on behalf of the Bolshevik Central Committee. Polkovnikov replied that his staff did not recognize the delegation. After he threatened to have them arrested, the Bolshevik delegates left and returned to Smolnyi.¹⁷³

Having heard the delegation’s report, the Milrevkom convened a second meeting of garrison delegates. Who came and on whose behalf cannot be determined. But it did not matter: by now, any casually assembled group could claim to represent the “Revolution.” On the Milrevkom’s motion, the meeting approved a fraudulent statement which claimed that although on October 21 the garrison had designated the Milrevkom as its “organ,” the staff refused both to recognize and to cooperate with it. No mention was made of the fact that the delegation had asked not for “recognition” or “cooperation,” but for authority to countermand the Staffs orders. The resolution went on:

In this manner, the staff has broken with the revolutionary garrison and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. Having broken with the organized garrison of the capital, the staff has turned into a direct weapon of counterrevolutionary forces.… Soldiers of Petrograd! (1) The defense of the revolutionary order against counterrevolutionary attempts falls on you, under the leadership of the Military-Revolutionary Committee. (2) All orders concerning the garrison lacking the signature of the Military-Revolutionary Committee are invalid …¹⁷⁴

The resolution achieved three objectives: it designated the Provisional Government, allegedly in the name of the Soviet, as “counterrevolutionary”; it divested it of authority over the garrison; and it provided the Milrevkom with an excuse to conceal its bid for power as a defense of the Revolution. It was a declaration of war.

On October 22, having learned of the Milrevkom’s attempt to take over the garrison, the Military Staff gave the Soviet an ultimatum: either retract its orders or face “decisive measures.”¹⁷⁵ Thinking it prudent to play for time, the Bolsheviks accepted the ultimatum “in principle” and offered to negotiate even as they were proceeding with the coup.¹⁷⁶ Later that day, the staff and the Milrevkom reached agreement on creating a “consultative body” of Soviet representatives to sit on the staff. On October 23, a delegation from the Milrevkom was sent to the staff, ostensibly for talks, but in fact to carry out “reconnaissance.”¹⁷⁷ These actions produced the desired effect, which was to prevent the government from arresting the Milrevkom. During the night of October 23–24, the cabinet (which seems to have led a kind of shadowy existence since the Kornilov days) ordered the closing of the two leading Bolshevik dailies and, for the sake of balance, an equal number of right-wing papers, including Zhivoe slovo, which in July had published information on Lenin’s contacts with the Germans. Troops were sent for to protect strategic points, including the Winter Palace. But when Kerensky asked for authority to have the Milrevkom arrested, he was dissuaded on the grounds that the staff was negotiating its differences with the Milrevkom.¹⁷⁸

Kerensky greatly underestimated the threat posed by the Bolsheviks: he not only did not fear a Bolshevik coup, he actually hoped for one, confident that it would enable him to crush and be rid of them once and for all. In mid-October, military commanders kept reporting to him that the Bolsheviks were making unmistakable preparations for an armed uprising. At the same time they assured him that in view of the Petrograd garrison’s “overwhelming” opposition to a coup, such an uprising would be promptly liquidated.¹⁷⁹ On the basis of these assessments, which misinterpreted opposition to Bolshevik plans to mean support for his government, Kerensky offered reassurances to colleagues and foreign ambassadors. Nabokov recalls him prepared to “offer prayers to produce this uprising” because he had ample forces to crush it.¹⁸⁰ To George Buchanan, Kerensky said more than once: “I only wish that [the Bolsheviks] would come out, and I will then put them down.”¹⁸¹