The Russian Revolution полностью

he could give no such guarantee either now or in the future: rebellion [kramola] has attained a level at which it was doubtful whether [bloodshed] could be avoided. All that remains is faith in the mercy of God.¹²¹

Still unconvinced, Nicholas asked Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich to assume dictatorial powers. The Grand Duke is said to have responded that the forces for a military dictatorship were unavailable and that unless the Tsar signed the manifesto he would shoot himself.¹²²

On October 17, Witte presented the Tsar with a report (doklad) summarizing the rationale for the manifesto which was to be issued jointly with it. Here he restated the conviction that the unrest afflicting Russia resulted neither from specific flaws in the country’s political system nor from the excesses of the revolutionaries. The cause had to be sought deeper, “in the disturbed equilibrium between the intellectual strivings of Russia’s thinking society and the external forms of its life.” The restoration of order, therefore, required fundamental changes. In the margin, Nicholas wrote: “Adopt for guidance.”¹²³

That evening, having crossed himself, Nicholas signed the manifesto. Its operative part consisted of three articles paralleling the three-part resolution of the September 1905 Zemstvo Congress:

We impose on the government the obligation to carry out our inflexible will:

1. To grant the population inviolable foundations of civil liberty [based] on the principles of genuine inviolability of person, the freedoms of conscience, speech, assembly, and association;

2. Without postponing the projected elections to the State Duma, insofar as possible, in view of the short time that remains before the convocation of that body, to include in its work those classes of the population which until now have been entirely deprived of the right to vote, and to extend in the future, through the new legislature, the principle of universal franchise; and,

3. To establish as inviolate the rule that no law shall acquire force without the approval of the State Duma and that the people’s representatives shall have an effective opportunity to participate in supervising the legality of the actions of the authorities whom We have appointed.*

Before retiring, Nicholas wrote in his diary: “After such a day, the head has grown heavy and thoughts have become confused. May the Lord help us save and pacify Russia.”

The proclamation of the October Manifesto, accompanied by Witte’s report of October 17, set off tumultuous demonstrations in all the cities of the Empire: no one had expected such concessions. In Moscow, a crowd of 50,000 gathered in front of the Bolshoi Theater. Thousands also assembled spontaneously in the other cities, singing and cheering. On October 19, the St. Petersburg Soviet voted to end the general strike.¹²⁴ The strike also collapsed in Moscow and elsewhere.

Two aspects of the October Manifesto call for comment, for otherwise a great deal of the political history of the last decade of the Imperial regime will be incomprehensible.

The manifesto was extracted from Nicholas under duress, virtually at the point of a gun. For this reason he never felt morally obligated to respect it.

Second, it made no mention of the word “constitution.” The omission was not an oversight. Although the claim has been made that Nicholas did not realize he had committed himself to a constitution,¹²⁵ contemporary sources leave no doubt that he knew better. Thus, he wrote his mother on October 19 that granting the Duma legislative authority meant “in essence, constitution.”¹²⁶ Even so, he wanted at all costs to avoid the detested word in order to preserve the illusion that he remained an autocrat. He had been assured by the proponents of liberal reforms that under a constitutional regime he would continue as the exclusive source of laws and that he could always revoke what he had granted.* He believed this explanation because it helped assuage his conscience, which was troubled by the thought that he might have violated his coronation oath. This self-deception—the absurd concept of a constitutional autocrat—would cause no end of trouble in relations between the Crown and the Duma in the years to come.

But when the October Manifesto was proclaimed, these problems were not apparent to the liberals and liberal-conservatives who felt confident that a new era had dawned. Even high police officials were telling each other, only half in jest, that they would soon have nothing left to do.¹²⁷