With such thoughts in mind, Kühlmann advocated a strict hands-off policy in Russia. In response to what apparently was a Bolshevik inquiry, he wanted to assure Moscow that neither the Germans nor the Finns had any designs on Petrograd: such assurances would make it possible to shift Latvian troops from west to east, where they were desperately needed to fight the Czech Legion.91
For those who believe that some days are more “historic” than others, June 28, 1918, should loom as one of the most historic of modern times, for it was on that day that the Kaiser, with one impulsive decision, saved the Bolshevik regime from the sentence of death which it was in his power to pass. The occasion was a report on the Russian question forwarded to him at his headquarters. He had before him two memoranda, one from the Foreign Office, signed by Chancellor Georg von Hertling, the other from Hindenburg. The rapporteur, Baron Kurt von Grünau, represented the Foreign Office on the Kaiser’s staff. Anyone with experience in such matters is aware of the power which a rapporteur wields on such occasions. When he presents to the chief executive policy options which require the latter to make a choice on the basis of very imperfect knowledge of the facts, he can, by subtle manipulation, push the decision-maker in the direction he favors. Grünau made full use of this opportunity to advance the interests of the Foreign Office. To a large extent, the Kaiser made his critical decision as a result of the manner in which Grünau presented the policy options to him:
It was an essential trait of the impulsive nature of the Kaiser, who was ruled by momentary moods and sudden flashes, to identify himself with the first arguments which an adviser presented to him, to the extent that they appeared to him to be conclusive [
The immediate effect of the Kaiser’s decision was to enable Trotsky to transfer Latvian regiments from the western border to the Volga-Ural front. Since they were the only pro-Bolshevik military units capable of combat, this action saved the Bolshevik regime in the east from total collapse. At the end of July, the 5th Latvian Regiment and elements of the 4th engaged the Czechoslovaks near Kazan, the 6th attacked them at Ekaterinburg, and the 7th suppressed an anti-Bolshevik uprising of armed workers at Izhevsk-Botkin. These operations turned the tide of battle in the Bolsheviks’ favor. In a telegram to Ioffe which German intelligence intercepted, Chicherin stressed how helpful it was for Soviet Russia to be able to withdraw troops from the German front and throw them against the Czechoslovaks.93
The long-term effect of the Kaiser’s verdict was to enable the Bolsheviks to weather the most critical period in their history. It would have cost the Germans no effort to seize Petrograd and only a bit more to occupy Moscow, both cities being virtually undefended. Then they could have repeated their Ukrainian operation and placed a puppet government over Russia. No one doubted their ability to do so. In April, when the Bolsheviks had been in a stronger position, Trotsky told Sadoul that they could be removed by a party backed by the Germans.94 The Kaiser’s decision at the end of June ended this possibility permanently: six weeks later, when their offensive in the west ground to a halt, the Germans were no longer in a position to intervene decisively in internal Russian affairs. The knowledge that the Germans continued to back the Bolsheviks also disheartened the Russian opposition. Relaying the Kaiser’s wishes to Moscow, Kühlmann instructed the embassy at the end of June to continue collaborating with Lenin. On July 1, Riezler broke off talks with the Right Center.95
