But where Pius was a political weight almost as great as Sulla, Sulla also accepted the allegiance of two young men on the rise. Like Metellus Pius, neither were strictly partisans of Sulla, but circumstances conspired to convince both to join. In time, both of these young men would become central figures in the final collapse of the Republic: Pompey the Great and Marcus Licinius Crassus.14
Still in his early twenties, Pompey was a man operating well above his station. He had never held a magistracy and currently held no official position in the army—but his family’s extensive client network made him a powerful force in Italy. During the years of Sulla’s absence, the Cinnans attempted to secure an alliance with young Pompey, but much to their horror, Pompey raised a personal army and led them to rendezvous not with Asiaticus and Norbanus, but with Sulla. Pompey was brash and cocky, but, eager to cement Pompey’s loyalty, Sulla indulged the boy like he was already a great man, going so far as to stand when Pompey entered a room. The defection of Pompey to the Sullans was a blow to Carbo and the other old Cinnans: not only were they denied the forces at Pompey’s disposal, but northeast Italy went from being a secure base of operations to a hostile front line.15
Also joining Sulla’s slow-moving army was a man who would become Pompey’s great rival in the years to come. Now over thirty, Marcus Licinius Crassus was the younger cousin of Crassus the Orator, but more importantly, the son of one of the proscribed victims in the Marian terror. While his father and older brother had been forced to commit suicide, Crassus himself had gotten away. After fleeing Rome, Crassus went to Spain, where his father had built an extensive network of clients. Taken in by a loyal friend of the family, Crassus lived in cave near the sea for eight months, his food, supplies, and even two slave girls provided by his benefactors. When Cinna died, Crassus emerged from hiding and, like Pompey, went round raising a personal legion to contribute to Sulla’s inevitable war effort. With a small army under his command, Crassus sailed to Italy and presented himself to Sulla. It was while in Sulla’s camp that Crassus opened his legendary rivalry with Pompey. Sulla treated young Pompey like a near equal while Crassus was treated as a junior officer—and Crassus sulked over the perceived slight. When Sulla dispatched Crassus north to recruit more men and Crassus asked for a military escort, Sulla shot back: “I give you as an escort your father, your brother, your friends, and your kinsmen, who were illegally and unjustly put to death, and whose murderers I am pursuing.”16
In addition to winning over neutral leaders, Sulla also attracted former enemies now looking to secure a spot on the winning side. Though Sulla knew how to nurse a grudge, he was also eager to make ostentatious displays of forgiveness. The consummate survivor Marcius Philippus—last seen in 91 railing against the optimates during the tribunate of Drusus the Younger—abandoned Rome and presented himself to Sulla. Far from being punished for collaborating with the Cinnans, the ex-consul was given a high command in Sulla’s army. Sulla’s broad clemency at this late stage even applied to core members of Marius’s inner circle. Publius Cornelius Cethegus had been among the twelve proscribed men specifically named by Sulla after his first march on Rome. Cethegus had managed to dodge Sulla’s patrols but now delivered himself into the hands of his former pursuer in the hope of surviving this latest crisis. Sulla welcomed these supplications as a chance to show clemency and forgiveness. And it was not just an empty show. Cethegus was given important responsibilities during the war. But the time was fast approaching for Sulla’s benevolence to give way to sterner treatment for his more incorrigible enemies.17
NOT EVERYONE WAS flocking to Sulla’s banner, though, and the consuls Norbanus and Asiaticus still commanded large armies. With Sulla marching up from the south, both consuls deployed their forces in Campania, blocking the two principal roads to Rome. With the south already falling under Sulla’s control, the goal now was to make a stand in Campania and block the final approach to Rome.18
Sulla’s legions first made contact with Norbanus’s army at Tifata on the Via Appia. Even on the eve of battle, Sulla was not sure how his men would respond to the order to fight. But the next morning they more than proved their loyalty. Fighting as tenaciously as they had against the armies of Mithridates, Sulla’s legions broke Norbanus’s army and sent it back to the safety of Capua. Sulla later said it was after the Battle of Tifata that he knew he was going to win the war—his men would follow him anywhere.19
