As he vacated the consulship, Sulla could rest easy knowing that as long as he held his military command he would be shielded from political prosecution. To offer the same protection for his friend and colleague Pompeius, Sulla arranged for Pompeius to take over Rome’s army at Asculum. Pompey Strabo had been at his post for three years, and now that the siege was over, it was time for a change in command. At Sulla’s insistence, the Senate directed Pompeius to take over Strabo’s army. This would not only protect Pompeius personally, but it would give Sulla a reliable army stationed just over the Apennines if Rome should make trouble while Sulla was in the east. But neither Pompey Strabo nor his men appreciated the abrupt change in command. Within days of his arrival in camp, Pompeius was unceremoniously murdered. The assailants were never caught, but Strabo himself was naturally suspected of masterminding the assassination.8
The murder of Pompeius shocked Sulla, and Rome suddenly felt less safe. Sulla kept himself under a tight bodyguard as he wrapped up a few last pieces of business in Rome. Within a few days, he departed for the safety of his legions at Capua.9
IT DID NOT take long for Cinna to break his oath after assuming the consulship in January 87. At the first opportunity, Cinna dispatched a tribune to indict Sulla for the illegal murder of Roman citizens. Sulla could plead senatus consultum ultimum all he wanted, but unlike Opimius in 121, and Marius in 100, the Senate never issued the Final Decree to Sulla in 88. But since a tribune’s authority only extended to the city limits of Rome, Sulla ignored the charges and instead continued mobilizing his legions to head east. He left one legion behind to maintain the siege of Nola and moved the other five down to the southeastern port of Brundisium (modern-day Brindisi). From there they would depart for Greece.10
Unable to prevent Sulla from leaving Italy, Cinna shredded the rest of the sacred oath he had sworn. Making a bid for widespread Italian support, he announced that he was going forward with Sulpicius’s program to disperse the Italians evenly through the thirty-one rural tribes. His colleague Octavius was appalled at the broken oath and rallied both conservative opinion and armed gangs.11
With political debates now inevitably decided in the streets, both sides rallied large groups of menacing partisans. Cinna called in throngs of Italians while Octavius mustered the plebs urbana, who were acutely aware they would be buried forever if the Italians were distributed evenly throughout the tribes. Inside Rome, the plebs urbana outnumbered the Italians, so when the two sides clashed, Cinna was forced to flee the city. Octavius then induced the Assembly to strip Cinna not just of his consulship, but his citizenship. To replace Cinna, the Assembly elevated a nonentity named Merula. His selection was not an accident—Merula was a member of an obscure priesthood that forbid participation in almost any public business. Octavius would wield sole power in Rome.12
But despite being outnumbered in Rome, Cinna had the numerical advantage everywhere else. The Italians were now aware the fight for political equality had moved from civitas to suffragium. They all now held Roman citizenship thanks to the
Cinna also had links to a large network of disaffected nobles he could call on to join him. Gnaeus Papirius Carbo—last seen in 89 passing a citizenship bill on behalf of the Italians—rallied forces of his own and joined Cinna. Also joining was Quintus Sertorius, a young officer who had shown loyal service to Marius while running supply networks out of Cisalpine Gaul during the Social War. Sertorius bore an implacable hatred of Sulla that would make him the last Marian general carrying on the Civil War, even after the rest were dead or defeated.14
