The facts are clear: Napoleon foresaw no danger in pressing on to Moscow, and neither Alexander nor his generals had the slightest thought of luring Napoleon on – they thought the very opposite. Napoleon was drawn on into Russia not by a preconceived plan – no one dreamt of any such possibility – but by some complex interplay of desires, motivation and machinations on the part of the warring contenders, who had no idea of how things would turn out and what would be Russia’s sole salvation. The whole thing was a fluke. Our armies were split up early on. We tried to bring them together, with every intention of joining battle and stopping the enemy’s advance, but, for all these attempts at unification, while managing to avoid battle with a far stronger enemy, we were forced into retreat at a sharp angle, thus drawing the French along with us to Smolensk. But there is more to it than that. We were retreating at a sharp angle not just because the French were moving in between the two armies; the angle was made sharper and we retreated further because Barclay de Tolly, an unpopular German, was loathed by Bagration, who was due to come under his command, and Bagration employed every delaying tactic in the book with the second army to avoid joining up with him only to hand over control. He delayed unification for as long as he could, even though unification was the main aim of everyone in authority, because he thought that marching his men would expose them to danger, and it would be best for him to edge to the left, southwards, harassing the enemy’s flank and rear and building up his army from Ukraine. But it seems likely that his real reason for thinking along these lines was to avoid placing himself under the command of Barclay, the hated German who was his junior in rank.
The Emperor was out with the army to boost morale but his presence there, his vacillation and the vast numbers of counsellors and plans available rendered the first army inactive, so it had to retreat.
The camp at Drissa was where they proposed to draw the line, but up rose Paulucci, with his eye on the commander-in-chief’s job, and his tireless efforts finally prevailed on Alexander, with the result that Pfuel’s entire scheme was abandoned and the whole thing was handed over to Barclay. But since Barclay failed to inspire complete confidence, limitations were placed on his power. The armies were split up, there was no unity of command and Barclay remained unpopular. But this mess arising from all the divisiveness and the unpopularity of the German commander-in-chief led to two things: on the one hand, vacillation and a reluctance to stand and fight, which could not have been avoided if the armies had been united and led by anyone but Barclay, and on the other hand, rising impatience with the Germans and a surge of patriotism.
At long last the Tsar withdrew from the army, on the pretext – the only convenient one available – of boosting morale in the two capitals in order to guarantee nationwide support for the war. And the Emperor’s visit to Moscow did succeed in trebling the Russian military strength. The Tsar had left the army so as not to cramp the style of the overall commander-in-chief, in the hope that more decisive action could be taken. But no, army command became even more confused and enfeebled. Bennigsen and the Tsarevich stayed on with a swarm of adjutants-general, to keep an eye on the commander-in-chief and urge him on to greater activity, but Barclay, more constrained than ever with all these ‘eyes of the Tsar’ on him, became increasingly wary of decisive action and ever more reluctant to fight.
Barclay insisted on caution. The Tsarevich hinted at treachery and demanded a general engagement. Lyubomirsky, Bronnitsky, Wlocki1 and others of that ilk raised such a hue and cry that Barclay got rid of the Polish generals on the pretext of sending some documents to the Tsar in Petersburg, and from now on it was open war with Bennigsen and the Tsarevich.
Down in Smolensk, despite Bagration’s best efforts to the contrary, the armies had come together at last.
Bagration drove up in his carriage to the house occupied by Barclay. Donning his sash, Barclay came out to welcome his superior officer and present his report. Bagration, not to be outdone when it came to displays of magnanimity, ignored his own higher rank and placed himself under Barclay’s command, though in doing so he agreed with him less than ever. He still reported directly to the Tsar, as he had been ordered to do. In a letter to Arakcheyev he wrote:
My sovereign’s will is supreme, but I can do nothing with this ‘minister’ [Barclay]. For heaven’s sake send me somewhere else if only to command a regiment. I cannot stay here. Headquarters is swarming with Germans, so no Russian can live here, and nothing makes any sense. I used to think I was serving my sovereign and my country, but as things have turned out I am serving Barclay. To be quite candid, I don’t like it.
