History tells us that Napoleon spent the whole of that day, the 25th of August, on horseback, inspecting the locality, going over plans submitted by his marshals, and issuing personal instructions to his generals.
The Russians’ original battle-line along the Kolocha had been broken, and the loss of the Shevardino redoubt on the 24th had caused them to pull back on the left flank. This section had not been entrenched, it was no longer protected by the river, and it was the only part of the front that gave on to flat, open ground. This was the obvious place for the French to attack, as any man, military or non-military, could have seen. One might have thought that this conclusion could have been reached without too much cogitation, without all the fuss and bother now indulged in by the Emperor and his marshals, and certainly without recourse to the remarkable and lofty faculty that goes by the name of genius, which is so lovingly ascribed to Napoleon. Yet the historians who later described the battle, the men surrounding the Emperor at the time and Napoleon himself all thought otherwise.
Napoleon rode up and down the field, examining the countryside with an air of profound introspection, nodding or shaking his head to himself as a register of approval or uncertainty but keeping his thoughts to himself, and, without a word to the surrounding generals about the profound thought processes that lay behind his decisions, he transmitted only his final conclusions, and these took the form of instructions. He listened carefully to a proposal from Davout, now the Duke of Eckmühl, that they should turn the Russian left flank, and then announced that there was no need for this, though he never explained why not. But when General Compans (who was due to attack the flèches) proposed taking his division through the woods, Napoleon signified his approval, even though the so-called Duke of Elchingen (Marshal Ney) ventured to observe that moving troops through woodland was a risky business that might break up the formation of the division.
Napoleon scrutinized the countryside across from the Shevardino redoubt, thought things over for a while in silence and then indicated two places where batteries were to be set up for tomorrow’s action against the Russian fortifications, and the line running from them along which the field artillery was to be deployed.
After issuing these orders, along with a number of others, he went back to his tent, and the battle-disposition of the troops was written down from his dictation.
This disposition, which French historians describe in rapturous terms and others treat with the greatest of respect, went as follows:
At daybreak two new batteries set up during the night on the plateau occupied by the Duke of Eckmühl to open fire on the two enemy batteries opposite.
At the same time General Pernetti, commander of the 1st Corps artillery, with thirty pieces from Compans’ division and all the howitzers from Desaix’s and Friant’s divisions, to advance, open fire and mount an intense bombardment of the enemy’s battery, which will then be under attack from the following:
General Fouché, commander of the 3rd Corps artillery, is to deploy all sixteen howitzers of the 3rd and 8th Corps on both flanks of the battery detailed to bombard the left-side entrenchment, bringing the total of guns ranged against it to 40.
General Sorbier to stand ready and, when ordered, to advance with all the guards artillery howitzers deployed against one or other of the enemy entrenchments.
Prince Poniatowski to advance on the village through the wood during the bombardment, and turn the enemy’s position.
General Compans to advance through the wood and take the first fortification.
With the battle thus under way further instructions will be issued in response to enemy movements.
Bombardment on the left flank to begin as soon as the cannons on the right are heard firing. Marksmen from the divisions of Morand and the Viceroy to open heavy fire the moment they see the attack on the right wing has begun.
Viceroy to take the village (Borodino) and cross by the three bridges, then keep level with Morand’s and Gérard’s divisions, all three advancing on the redoubt under his command and coming into line with the rest of our troops.
All this to be carried out in good order, protecting the reserve as far as possible.
Imperial Camp at Mozhaysk,
6th September (25th August Old Style) 1812.
These arrangements, obscure and confused as they are in this written form – if we can take time off from worshipping Napoleon’s military genius and look at his actual instructions – boil down to four points, four basic instructions, none of which was carried out, or ever could have been.
