Let us imagine two men, who have come out to fight a duel with swords 1 accordance with all the rules of the art of swordsmanship. The fencing as lasted for some time. All at once one of the combatants, feeling that e is wounded, grasping that it is no joking matter, but a question of fe and death, flings away his sword, and snatching up the first cudgel that )mes handy, begins to brandish that. But let us imagine that the com- atant, who has so sensibly made use of the best and simplest means for le attainment of his object, should be inspired by the traditions of chiv- iry to try and disguise the real cause of the conflict and should persist in eclaring that he had been victor in the duel in accordance with all the lies of swordsmanship. One can imagine what confusion and obscurity ould arise from his description of the duel!
The duellist, who insisted on the conflict being fought in accordance ith the principles of the fencer’s art, stands for the French; his opponent, ho flung away his sword and snatched up a cudgel, did like the Rus- ans; and the attempted description of the duel in accordance with the lies of swordsmanship has been given us by the historians of the war.
From the time of the burning of Smolensk a war began which did not Alow any of the old traditions of warfare. The burning of towns and illages, the retreat after every battle, the blow dealt at Borodino and fllowed by retreat, the burning of Moscow, the capture of marauders, le seizing of transports,—the whole of the irregular warfare was a de- arture from the rules.
Napoleon was aware of it, and from the time when he stood waiting 1 Moscow in the correct pose of the victorious fencer, and instead of his
opponent’s sword, saw the bludgeon raised against him, he never ceas( complaining to Kutuzov and to the Emperor Alexander that the war w; being conducted contrary to all the rules of war. (As though any rul existed for the slaughter of men!)
In spite of the complaints of the French that they did not keep to tl rules, in spite of the fact that the Russians in the highest positions fe it somehow shameful to be fighting with a cudgel, and wanted to take e the correct position en quarte or en tierce, to make a skilful thrust, { prime and so on, the cudgel of the people’s war was raised in all its mena> ing and majestic power; and troubling itself about no question of ar one’s tastes or rules, about no fine distinctions, with stupid simplicit; with perfect consistency, it rose and fell and belaboured the French ti the whole invading army had been driven out.
And happy the people that will not, as the French did in 1813, salu ing according to the rules, gracefully and cautiously offer the sword hi to the magnanimous conqueror. Happy the people who, in the moment c trial, asks no questions how others would act by the recognised rules i such cases, but with ease and directness picks up the first cudgel thf comes handy and deals blows with it, till resentment and revenge giv way to contempt and pity.
II
One of the most conspicuous and advantageous departures from the sc called rules of warfare is the independent action of men acting separatel against men huddled together in a mass. Such independent activity i always seen in a war that assumes a national character. In this kind c warfare, instead of forming in a crowd to attack a crowd, men dispers in small groups, attack singly and at once fly, when attacked by superio forces, and then attack again, when an opportunity presents itself. Sue were the methods of the guerillas in Spain; of the mountain tribes in th Caucasus, and of the Russians in 1812.
War of this kind has been called partisan warfare on the suppositio that this name defined its special significance. But this kind of warfar does not follow any rules of war, but is in direct contradiction to a well known rule of tactics, regarded as infallible. That rule lays it down tha the attacking party must concentrate his forces in order to be stronge than his opponent at the moment of conflict.
Partisan warfare (always successful, as history testifies) acts in direc contradiction of this rule.
Military science assumes that the relative strength of forces is identica with their numerical proportions. Military science maintains that th greater the number of soldiers, the greater their strength. Les gros batail Ions ont toujours raison.
To say this is as though one were in mechanics to say that forces wer equal or unequal simply because the masses of the moving bodies wer equal or unequal.
Force (the volume of motion) is the product of the mass into the 'locity.
In warfare the force of armies is the product of the mass multiplied by :mething else, an unknown x.
