Manstein’s plan of attack was based upon starting with “salami-slicing tactics” to eviscerate and weaken critical parts of Petrov’s outer defenses with well-supported battalion-size attacks, then follow through with all-out division-size attacks when a sector began to crumble. Once again, Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps would make the main effort. Manstein noted that Petrov’s outer defenses were overextended in Sector IV where the 95th Rifle Division and Zhidilov’s 8th NIB were trying to maintain control of the area around Coastal Battery No. 10. Here, the Black Sea Fleet wanted this battery held, even though it stretched the defensive perimeter in Sector IV to a dangerous degree. The obvious weak point was the boundary between Sectors III and IV in the Bel’bek River valley, which is precisely where Manstein decided to place his Schwerpunkt. He was less certain about how strong the center of Petrov’s line was in Sectors II and III, but he wanted to probe aggressively and see what developed. However, he had no intention of XXX Armeekorps renewing an effort to take Balaklava, which he knew had been heavily reinforced; instead, by shifting his main effort from his left to his right, he hoped to catch Petrov by surprise.

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At 0610hrs on December 17, 1941, Zuckertort’s artillery began a short preparatory barrage, followed by Fliegerkorps IV Stukas and level-bombers attacking Soviet artillery positions. Amazingly, the Soviets were caught by surprise, since they did not expect the Germans to mount a winter offensive. Each of Hansen’s infantry regiments had massed their remaining combat-ready infantry into two assault battalions, reducing their third battalions to cadre strength. The Germans attacked in small Stossgruppen, as they had learned at Perekop and Ishun, but with refined tactics. A few pioneers would rush forward in “buddy teams” to hurl smoke grenades at sites selected to breach the Soviet barbed wire, which was much less dense than at Perekop. Once sufficient smoke obscured the designated breach site, another pioneer team would move forward and blow up the wire obstacle with Bangalore torpedoes. Once the breach was created, small teams of grenadiers would move forward and hurl multiple Stielhandgranaten to suppress any defenders on the other side of the breach. Only then would the assault team move into and through the breach to assault the nearest Soviet defensive position with grenades and flamethrowers. Due to weeks of inactivity, many Soviet sectors were only lightly manned, and the forward outposts fell quickly to this style of blitz assault.

Hansen made his main effort with the 22., 24., and 132. Infanterie-Divisionen against Sectors III and IV, while the 50. Infanterie-Division and the Romanian 1st Mountain Brigade made a supporting attack against Sector II. The greatest success was achieved in the north near the village of Duvankoi and the Bel’bek River valley. Zhidilov’s 8th NIB had four battalions deployed along a 4-mile-long front, with a fifth battalion in reserve and the brigade command post situated on the rear slope of Mount Aziz-Oba (which meant “Holy Hill” in Tatar). Generalmajor Ludwig Wolff’s 22. Infanterie-Division hit the 8th NIB’s two right-flank battalions with two battalions from IR 16, while two battalions from Oberst Ernst Haccius’s IR 65 stormed Mount Aziz-Oba and threatened the brigade command post. Given the size of the mountain and the rugged terrain, this was an amazing achievement, which seriously weakened the outer defenses of Sevastopol. Zhidilov quickly counterattacked with his reserve battalion, which temporarily slowed, but did not stop the German advance. Captain Georgy A. Aleksandr’s Coastal Battery No. 30 fired 96 305mm shells at Wolff’s troops, although the fire was not particularly accurate. By the end of the first day, Wolff’s four assault battalions had advanced up to 1¼ miles and seriously damaged Zhidilov’s right flank.

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