The 51st Army had also taken advantage of Himer’s retreat from Kerch to break out from the Kamysh Burun beachhead, and Colonel Mikhail K. Zubkov’s 302nd Mountain Rifle Division liberated Kerch on December 31. By the next day, the 51st Army began liberating the rest of the eastern Kerch Peninsula. Soon, XXXXII Armeekorps would have to face two Soviet armies, determined to push west toward Sevastopol. Could this paper-thin defense hold? If not, the entire German position in the Crimea was at risk. However, this was no longer Sponeck’s problem, since Manstein relieved him of command on New Year’s Eve. Within three weeks, Sponeck was courtmartialed in Germany for disobedience and retreating without orders. Although many other German commanders had done the same during the Soviet Winter Counteroffensive, the regime chose to make an example of Sponeck, who was sentenced to death, thereafter commuted to six years’ imprisonment. Manstein said nothing on behalf of his subordinate, and allowed the new commander of Heeresgruppe Süd, Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Reichenau, to impose group punishment upon the entire 46. Infanterie-Division. Reichenau ordered that, “because of its slack reaction to the Russian landing on the Kerch Peninsula, as well as its precipitate withdrawal from the Peninsula, I hereby declare 46. Infanterie-Division forfeit of soldierly honor. Decorations and promotions are in abeyance until countermanded.”10
Inside his underground headquarters in Sevastopol, Vice-Admiral Oktyabrsky planned to mount an amphibious diversionary operation to prevent Manstein from sending any of his limited reserves to interfere with the 44th Army’s landings at Feodosiya. He reckoned that the Germans were stretched so thinly that they could not afford to deal with another crisis. An obvious target was the port of Yevpatoriya, located on the coast only 40 miles north of Sevastopol. Oktyabrsky and Petrov envisioned a lightning amphibious raid to seize the harbor at Yevpatoriya – believed to be lightly guarded by Romanian troops – which would then be used to host a larger landing by a brigade-size force. There was talk of a paratroop landing and using partisans to support it, but details were sketchy. If a large enough force could be landed at Yevpatoriya, Manstein would be placed on the horns of a dilemma: being forced to choose between sending his limited reserves to the east or west, but not both. Oktyabrsky wanted the landing to occur shortly after New Year, but the winter storm that had plagued the Kerch landings returned and made this impossible for several days. It was not until the evening of January 4, 1942, that the weather abated enough for the landing to be attempted.
At 2330hrs on January 4, a small flotilla consisting of the
