Where the Iron Crosses Grow полностью

Failure to achieve a clean breakthrough brought instant recriminations, with Kozlov blaming the weather. Although Tolbukhin was certainly at fault, as chief of staff, for the poor planning, Mekhlis put the brunt of the blame on him and had him relieved. Stalin ordered Kozlov to immediately begin preparing for another offensive, to start within ten days. The plan for the second attack paid more attention to the German defenses and decided to concentrate most of the 51st Army’s offensive power against Stützpunkt Koi-Asan in the center of the enemy line, reckoning that its loss would allow Lvov to punch through Mattenklott’s line. Kozlov also directed that this time, the 44th Army would play a greater role in the offensive by mounting a diversionary attack against the 132. Infanterie-Division positions along the Black Sea coast. Mekhlis, who had no tactical experience, bragged that “we’ll organize the big music for the Germans!” and then foolishly directed Kozlov to split up his 224 tanks among the rifle divisions, rather then keep them as a mobile exploitation force.³¹ Rather optimistically, Kozlov claimed that his forces could advance 2½ miles in a three-day offensive. Stalin also ensured that the VVS-Crimean Front was greatly reinforced, and by early March it had 581 aircraft, although most were older I-16 fighters, I-153 fighter-bombers, and DB-3 bombers. The Germans used the respite to reinforce the Koi-Asan position with over 2,000 Teller antitank mines.³²

It was snowing when Kozlov’s second offensive began at 0900hrs on March 13. Lvov attacked with three rifle divisions across terrain that was still too waterlogged to prevent rapid tactical movements, and the initial results were the same as before: all Soviet attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. Mekhlis ordered the armor committed in order to support the infantry, but they ran into antiarmor ambushes established by two assault-gun companies. But 1. Kompanie of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 197 had a great day, with Leutnant Johann Spielmann’s section claiming 14 T-34s destroyed and Oberwachtmeister Fritz Schrödel personally claiming eight enemy tanks, including three KV-2s. The Soviet armor did manage to inflict some losses, including a direct hit on Oberleutnant Nottebrock’s StuG III, which mortally wounded the commander of 2./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 249.³³ It is clear that the Soviet armor was destroyed in piecemeal fashion, with 157 tanks lost in the first three days of fighting. More than half of these losses came from the 56th Tank Brigade, which lost 88 of its tanks. Spielmann was awarded the Ritterkreuz for his battlefield accomplishment.

However, XXXXII Armeekorps was beginning to suffer from losses, and air attacks by the VVS-Crimean Front were becoming increasingly painful. Once again, Soviet DB-3 bombers blew up the main ammunition dump at Vladislavovka, detonating 60 tons of munitions. While II./JG 77, newly arrived in the Crimea from refitting in Germany, inflicted heavy losses upon the older fighters of the VVS-Crimean Front, it could not gain air superiority over the Parpach sector. Heavy expenditures of infantry finally paid off, and the 51st Army captured Stützpunkt Korpech’ from IR 105 on March 14, as well as a battery of three 10.5cm f. FH 18 howitzers and nine Nebelwerfer launchers. Mattenklott’s defenses were seriously dented, but Kozlov’s artillery had expended most of its ammunition and a pause was necessary before the offensive could be renewed.