Yeltsin полностью

The words from the Moscow soapbox were the talk of the town. Yeltsin’s speech was a “strong fresh wind” for the party, Gorbachev told him. The general secretary, Yeltsin adds, said this “without an approving smile and with a blank look on his face.”⁴⁶ “From that moment,” says Anatolii Chernyayev, the perspicacious foreign-policy aide to Gorbachev from 1985 to 1991, “dates [Yeltsin’s] glory.” He wrote in his diary that “in spirit, in vocabulary, and in approaches” the speech was putting forth “new norms of life and activity” for the regime. Chernyayev noticed lines at newsstands for that day’s Moskovskaya pravda, the Moscow newspaper that carried the text.⁴⁷

Yeltsin on February 26, 1986, regaled the delegates to the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the whole CPSU. Orthodox in some ways, heterodox in others, his missionary speechifying broadened the discourse about Soviet reform by flogging “the infallibility of officialdom,” its “special blessings” (material privileges), and the smothering of innovation by an “inert stratum of time servers with party cards.” Yeltsin was the first spokesman at this level to propose some revision to political structures (“periodic accountability” of leaders from the general secretary on down) and to say that the regime’s very continuance depended on disinfecting changes taking hold. In his best line, he also gave the national audience a taste of the theatricality so well known in Sverdlovsk. Why had he not been as forthright at the last party congress in 1981? “I can answer and answer sincerely. I did not then have enough courage and political experience.”⁴⁸ By inference, he now had both.

The priority in Moscow was a cadres shakeup. “Conservatism has gone way too far among us,” Yeltsin fumed before several thousand agitprop workers, officials who propagated the party line in the media and the education system, at the House of Political Enlightenment on April 11, 1986. “The city authorities have been playing make-believe [zanimalis’ pokazukhoi]: ‘We know what we are doing, everything is A-plus here, we are the tops in the world, there is no need to wash Moscow’s dirty laundry in public.’ Those who keep on thinking this way should vacate their places and clear out.”⁴⁹ Many did. His first week as viceroy, Yeltsin gave Vladimir Promyslov, who had been mayor since Khrushchev’s day and was politically independent of Grishin, until noon the day after to leave. When Promyslov stalled for time, Yeltsin telephoned him and “suggested that he depart the easy way and not the hard way”; twenty minutes later, Promyslov had quit. To succeed him, Yeltsin tapped Valerii Saikin, the director of the ZIL Works, the biggest auto plant in the USSR; he had to talk Gorbachev out of appointing Saikin Soviet minister of the automobile industry.⁵⁰ In twenty-two months, Yeltsin retired all of the Grishin-appointed secretaries of the gorkom, two-thirds of the raion first secretaries, and, with Saikin, about 90 percent of the leaders in the Promyslov municipal machine. The replacements, better trained technically and up to twenty-five years younger, were often plucked from nonstandard channels, particularly, as in Sverdlovsk, from the ranks of factory management. Yeltsin, an interloper in the capital, had to rely on locals for personnel advice, but he did not always take it: “Like a wild animal, he had a feel for any imprecision, for any falseness in tonality, and was always on his guard. . . . If he asked you whom to appoint to some post and you gave a name right away, before you knew it that person would be appointed. If you said you needed to think about it, he would set to thinking himself whether to make the appointment or not.”⁵¹