Yeltsin полностью

If history were the touchstone, Gorbachev had little to worry about. As far back as the 1920s, the also-rans in personality and factional quarrels within the party had never recouped their losses. The renunciation of violence after Stalin left general secretaries with ample means for sidelining an opponent. Gorbachev made it plain to Yeltsin that he was ostracized from upper-level political activity. How the ban was expressed depends on whose memoir one reads. Yeltsin says it was permanent and general: “I will no longer let you take part in politics [politika].” Gorbachev writes in his Life and Reforms of saying to Yeltsin that he “could not return to the sphere of big-time politics [sfera bol’shoi politiki] any time soon,” which connotes a door ajar.¹¹ Gorbachev might have wielded a much heavier truncheon than this. He could have pensioned Yeltsin off, a possibility that surfaced in irritable conversations between them in November 1987. Gorbachev did not want this solution. He wisecracked to Yeltsin that he was against retirement since, they being the same age, it might be thought appropriate for him as well.¹² Yeltsin was still a member of the CPSU Central Committee. Under the rulebook, only a congress of the party could expel him against his will, but Gorbachev was capable of forcing him to resign. In fact he did that to ninety-eight longin-the-tooth members of the committee in April 1989, but not to Yeltsin. Another device forsworn was to make Yeltsin ambassador to a distant capital—as Nikita Khrushchev did in 1957 when he made Vyacheslav Molotov, who had been prime minister under Stalin, Soviet envoy to Outer Mongolia.¹³ Yeltsin believed Gorbachev preferred to keep him in Moscow and in his sights: “He thought I was less of a risk nearby. It is always best to keep a freethinker close at hand, so you can keep him under observation. And what would an ambassador be up to? Who knew?”¹⁴

So why the lenience? In his memoirs, Gorbachev credits it to his chivalry (“It is not in me to make short work of people”) and collectivism (“the strong belief that with us everything had to be done on the basis of comradeship”).¹⁵ But it was not all about the kindliness of the general secretary. Yeltsin points to a more political theory, that Gorbachev wanted him to survive as a balance against conservatives and fence-sitters: “It seems to me that if Gorbachev had not had a Yeltsin he would have had to invent one.”¹⁶ Gorbachev’s desire to use Yeltsin as a counterweight dovetailed with his reading of the past record, which was that no one in Yeltsin’s unenviable predicament could pose a threat. To these, there needs to be added an attitudinal factor: cocksureness. Georgii Shakhnazarov, Gorbachev’s main political aide, several times implored him to expatriate Yeltsin, to an ambassadorship, and absent him from the upcoming USSR elections. Gorbachev would not countenance it. “He regarded Yeltsin as semiliterate, as understanding nothing, as a drunkard.” He sorely misjudged Yeltsin and, says the cerebral Shakhnazarov, refused to see that Yeltsin’s personality, the festering grudge Yeltsin bore, and the pentup appetite for change might commix into “an explosive force.”¹⁷

Had the Soviet rules of the game still applied, Yeltsin’s political career would have been well and truly over. But the game was in kaleidoscopic motion, and soon was to provide undreamt-of opportunities outside the iron cage of the bureaucracy. His intuition in 1987 about which way the wind was blowing, the action of speaking out before the Central Committee, and Gorbachev’s overkill reaction to it constituted an inflection point in the breakup of the communist system. The juncture set up a robust alignment of political forces on the macro issue of how fast the system should change: Yeltsin in the van as the apotheosis of change, party conservatives in the rear, Gorbachev in the spongy middle. Successive crises and feedback loops were to fortify it even as the political spectrum was displaced in a more revolutionary direction. Originally limited to the elite, the fatal alignment would reproduce itself in the population when electoral freedom made it relevant to them, which in turn widened the fissures at the elite plateau. As one of the directors of Yeltsin’s eventual campaign for president of Russia was to remark in 1991, “This campaign began in 1987.”¹⁸

On November 19, 1987, a bulletin from the TASS news agency said Yeltsin had been appointed first deputy chairman of Gosstroi, the State Construction Committee of the Soviet Union. His blackest fears had gone unrealized. He was not to be banished to Ulan Bator or Addis Ababa, or to a muddy Soviet construction site, or to a cottage in Moscow oblast. The new position was a sinecure, on a rank with minister in the USSR government, and was at the summit of an industry Yeltsin had known since his twenties.