could not be done, but within a week of the announcement the minutes of the Permanent
Mandates Commission were released. They showed that the commission had, by
unanimous vote, decided that the policy of the White Paper was contrary to the accepted
interpretations of the mandate, and, by a vote of 4-3, that the White Paper was
inconsistent with the mandate under any possible interpretation. In this last vote Hankey,
at his first session of the commission, voted in the minority.
As a result of the release of this information, a considerable section of the House was
disturbed by the government's high-handed actions and by the Colonial Secretary's
evasive answers in July 1939. In March 1940, Noel-Baker introduced a motion of censure
on this issue. The motion did not go to a division, but Amery once again objected to the
new policy and to inviting representatives of the Arab states to the abortive Round Table
Conference of 1939. He called the presence of agents of the Mufti at the Round Table
"surrender."
By this time the Milner Group was badly shattered on other issues than Palestine.
Within two months of this debate, it was reunited on the issue of all-out war against
Germany, and Amery had resumed a seat in the Cabinet as Secretary of State for India.
The Palestine issue declined in importance and did not revive to any extent until the
Labour government of 1945 had taken office. From that time on the members of the
Milner Group were united again on the issue, objecting to the Labour government's anti-
Jewish policy and generally following the line Amery had laid down in 1939. In fact, it
was Amery who did much of the talking in 1946-1949, but this is not strictly part of our
story.
In Irish affairs, the Milner Group played a much more decisive role than in Palestine
affairs, although only for the brief period from 1917 to 1925. Previous to 1917 and going
back to 1887, Irish affairs had been one of the most immediate concerns of the Cecil
Bloc. A nephew of Lord Salisbury was Chief Secretary for Ireland in 1887-1891, another
nephew held the post in 1895-1900, and the private secretary and protege of the former
held the post in 1900-1905. The Cecil Bloc had always been opposed to Home Rule for
Ireland, and when, in 1912-1914, the Liberal government took steps to grant Home Rule,
Sir Edward Carson took the lead in opposing these steps. Carson was a creation of the
Cecil Bloc, a fact admitted by Balfour in 1929, when he told his niece, "I made Carson."
Balfour found Carson a simple Dublin barrister in 1887, when he went to Ireland as Chief
Secretary. He made Carson one of his chief prosecuting attorneys in 1887, an M.P. for
Dublin University in 1892, and Solicitor General in his own government in 1900-1906.
When the Home Rule Bill of 1914 was about to pass, Carson organized a private army,
known as the Ulster Volunteers, armed them with guns smuggled in from Germany, and
formed a plot to seize control of Belfast at a given signal from him. This signal, in the
form of a code telegram, was written in 1914 and on its way to be dispatched by Carson
when he received word from Asquith that war with Germany was inevitable.
Accordingly, the revolt was canceled and the date on which the Home Rule Bill was to
go into effect was postponed by special act of Parliament until six months after peace
should be signed.
The information about the telegram of 1914 was revealed to Lionel Curtis by Carson
in a personal conversation after war began. Curtis's attitude was quite different, and he
thoroughly disapproved of Carson's plot. This difference is an indication of the difference
in point of view in regard to Ireland between the Milner Group and the Cecil Bloc. The
latter was willing to oppose Home Rule even to the point where it would condone illegal
actions; the former, on the contrary, was in favor of Home Rule because it believed that
Ireland would aid Britain's enemies in every crisis and leave the Commonwealth at the
first opportunity unless it were given freedom to govern itself.
The Milner Group's attitude toward the Irish question was expressed by
“The root principle of
by themselves"—and it demanded that within the Empire this principle should be
persistently pursued and expressed in institutions. For that reason it denounced the post-
war attempt to repress the Irish demand for national self-government by ruthless violence
after a century of union had failed to win Irish consent, as a policy in conflict with British
institutions and inconsistent with the principle of the British Commonwealth; and it
played its part in achieving the Irish Treaty and the Dominion settlement.”
The part which the Group played in the Irish settlement was considerably more than
this brief passage might indicate, but it could not take effect until the group in Britain