of the Milner Group. The reference to the South African delegation meant Smuts, for
Botha was prepared to sign, no matter what he felt about the treaty, in order to win for his
country official recognition as a Dominion of equal status with Britain. Smuts, on the
other hand, refused to sign from the beginning and, as late as 23 June 1919, reiterated his
refusal (according to Mrs. Millen's biography of Smuts).
Lloyd George's objections to the treaty as presented in the Council of Four on 2 June
were those which soon became the trademark of the Milner Group. In addition to
criticisms of the territorial clauses on the Polish frontier and a demand for a plebiscite in
Upper Silesia, the chief objections were aimed at reparations and the occupation of the
Rhineland. On the former point, Lloyd George's advisers"thought that more had been
asked for than Germany could pay." On the latter point, which "was the main British
concern," his advisers were insistent. "They urged that when the German Army was
reduced to a strength of 100,000 men it was ridiculous to maintain an army of occupation
of 200,000 men on the Rhine. They represented that it was only a method of quartering
the French Army on Germany and making Germany pay the cost. It had been pointed out
that Germany would not constitute a danger to France for 30 years or even 50 years;
certainly not in 15 years.... The advice of the British military authorities was that two
years was the utmost limit of time for the occupation."
To these complaints, Clemenceau had replied that "in England the view seemed to
prevail that the easiest way to finish the war was by making concessions. In France the
contrary view was held that it was best to act firmly. The French people, unfortunately,
knew the Germans very intimately, and they believed that the more concessions we
made, the more the Germans would demand.... He recognized that Germany was not an
immediate menace to France. But Germany would sign the Treaty with every intention of
not carrying it out. Evasions would be made first on one point and then on another. The
whole Treaty would go by the board if there were not some guarantees such as were
provided by the occupation."' (1)
Under such circumstances as these, it seems rather graceless for the Milner Group to
have started at once, as it did, a campaign of recrimination against the treaty. Philip Kerr
was from 1905 to his death in 1940 at the very center of the Milner Group. His violent
Germanophobia in 1908-1918, and his evident familiarity with the character of the
Germans and with the kind of treaty which they would have imposed on Britain had the
roles been reversed, should have made the Treaty of Versailles very acceptable to him
and his companions, or, if not, unacceptable on grounds of excessive leniency. Instead,
Kerr, Brand, Curtis, and the whole inner core of the Milner Group began a campaign to
undermine the treaty, the League of Nations, and the whole peace settlement. Those who
are familiar with the activities of the "Cliveden Set" in the 1930s have generally felt that
the appeasement policy associated with that group was a manifestation of the period after
1934 only. This is quite mistaken. The Milner Group, which was the reality behind the
phantom-like Cliveden Set, began their program of appeasement and revision of the
settlement as early as 1919. Why did they do this?
To answer this question, we must fall back on the statements of the members of the
Group, general impressions of their psychological outlook, and even a certain amount of
conjecture. The best statement of what the Group found objectionable in the peace of
1919 will be found in a brilliant book of Zimmern's called
(1922). More concrete criticism, especially in regard to the Covenant of the League, will
be found in
be found in Harold Nicolson's famous book
personal relationships with most of the inner core of the Milner Group, was not a member
of the Group himself, but his psychology in 1918-1920 was similar to that of the
members of the inner core.
In general, the members of this inner core took the propagandist slogans of 1914-1918
as a truthful picture of the situation. I have indicated how the Group had worked out a
theory of history that saw the whole past in terms of a long struggle between the forces of
evil and the forces of righteousness. The latter they defined at various times as "the rule
of law" (a la Dicey), as "the subordination of each to the welfare of all," as "democracy,"
etc. They accepted Wilson's identification of his war aims with his war slogans ("a world
safe for democracy," "a war to end wars," "a war to end Prussianism," "self-
determination," etc.) as meaning what they meant by "the rule of law." They accepted his
Fourteen Points (except "freedom of the seas") as implementation of these aims.