Moreover, the Milner Group, and apparently Wilson, made an assumption which had a
valid basis but which could be very dangerous if carried out carelessly. This was the
assumption that the Germans were divided into two groups, "Prussian autocrats" and
"good Germans." They assumed that, if the former group were removed from positions of
power and influence, and magnanimous concessions were made to the latter, Germany
could be won over on a permanent basis from "Asiatic despotism" to "Western
civilization." In its main outlines, the thesis was valid. But difficulties were numerous.
In the first place, it is not possible to distinguish between "good" Germans and "bad"
Germans by any objective criterion. The distinction certainly could not be based on who
was in public office in 1914-1918. In fact, the overwhelming mass of Germans—almost
all the middle classes, except a few intellectuals and very religious persons; a
considerable portion of the aristocratic class (at least half); and certain segments of the
working class (about one-fifth)—were "bad" Germans in the sense in which the Milner
Group used that expression. In their saner moments, the Group knew this. In December
1918, Curtis wrote in
nation itself was involved in the sin. There were Socialists who licked their lips over
Brest-Litovsk. All but a mere remnant, and those largely in prison or exile, accepted or
justified the creed of despotism so long as it promised them the mastery of the world. The
German People consented to be slaves in their own house as the price of enslaving
mankind." If these words had been printed and posted on the walls of All Souls, of
Chatham House, of New College, of
War with Germany. But these words were not remembered by the Group. Instead, they
assumed that the "bad" Germans were the small group that was removed from office in
1918 with the Kaiser. They did not see that the Kaiser was merely a kind of facade for
four other groups: The Prussian Officers' Corps, the Junker landlords, the governmental
bureaucracy (especially the administrators of police and justice), and the great
industrialists. They did not see that these four had been able to save themselves in 1918
by jettisoning the Kaiser, who had become a liability. They did not see that these four
were left in their positions of influence, with their power practically intact—indeed, in
many ways with their power greater than ever, since the new "democratic" politicians like
Ebert, Scheidemann, and Noske were much more subservient to the four groups than the
old imperial authorities had ever been. General Gröner gave orders to Ebert over his
direct telephone line from Kassel in a tone and with a directness that he would never have
used to an imperial chancellor. In a word, there was no revolution in Germany in 1918.
The Milner Group did not see this, because they did not want to see it. Not that they were
not warned. Brigadier General John H. Morgan, who was almost a member of the Group
and who was on the Inter-allied Military Commission of Control in Germany in 1919-
1923, persistently warned the government and the Group of the continued existence and
growing power of the German Officers' Corps and of the unreformed character of the
German people. As a graduate of Balliol and the University of Berlin (1897-1905), a
leader-writer on
Parliament with Amery in 1910, an assistant adjutant general with the military section of
the British delegation to the Peace Conference of 1919, the British member on the
Prisoners of War Commission (1919), legal editor of
edition), contributor to
1936), Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of London, Rhodes Lecturer at
London (1927-1932), counsel to the Indian Chamber of Princes (1934-1937), counsel to
the Indian State of Gwalior, Tagore Professor at Calcutta (1939)—as all of these things,
and thus close to many members of the Group, General Morgan issued warnings about
Germany that should have been heeded by the Group. They were not. No more attention
was paid to them than was paid to the somewhat similar warnings coming from Professor
Zimmern. And the general, with less courage than the professor, or perhaps with more of
that peculiar group loyalty which pervades his social class in England, kept his warnings
secret and private for years. Only in October 1924 did he come out in public with an
article in the
platform in a published book (