Only they would insist, in such a case, that the League was destroyed not by them but by
the persons who tried to use it as an instrument of collective security.
All of this may sound extreme. Unfortunately, it is not extreme. That this was what the
Group did to the League is established beyond doubt in history. That the Group intended
to do this is equally beyond dispute. The evidence is conclusive.
The British ideas on the League and the British drafts of the Covenant were formed by
four men, all close to the Milner Group. They were Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts,
Lord Phillimore, and Alfred Zimmern. For drafting documents they frequently used Cecil
Hurst, a close associate, but not a member, of the Group. Hurst (Sir Cecil since 1920) was
assistant legal adviser to the Foreign Office in 1902-1918, legal adviser in 1918-1929, a
judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague in 1929-1946, and
Chairman of the United Nations War Crimes Commission in 1943-1944. He was the man
responsible for the verbal form of Articles 10-16 (the sanction articles) of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, for the Articles of Agreement with Ireland in 1921, and for the
wording of the Locarno Pact in 1925. He frequently worked closely with the Milner
Group. For example, in 1921 he was instrumental in making an agreement by which the
British Yearbook of International Law, of which he was editor, was affiliated with the
Royal Institute of International Affairs. At the time, he and Curtis were working together
on the Irish agreement.
As early as 1916, Lord Robert Cecil was trying to persuade the Cabinet to support a
League of Nations. This resulted in the appointment of the Phillimore Committee, which
drew up the first British draft for the Covenant. As a result, in 1918-1919 Lord Robert
became the chief government spokesman for a League of Nations and the presumed
author of the second British draft. The real author of this second draft was Alfred
Zimmern. Cecil and Zimmern were both dubious of any organization that would restrict
state sovereignty. On 12 November 1918, the day after the armistice, Lord Robert made a
speech at Birmingham on the type of League he expected. That speech shows clearly that
he had little faith in the possibility of disarmament and none in international justice or
military sanctions to preserve the peace. The sovereignty of each state was left intact. As
W. E. Rappard (director of the Graduate School of International Studies at Geneva) wrote
in
possibility of submitting vital international questions to the judgment of courts of law end
'confessed to the gravest doubts' as to the practicability of enforcing the decrees of such
courts by any 'form of international force.' On the other hand, he firmly believed in the
efficacy of economic pressure as a means of coercing a country bent on aggression in
violation of its pacific agreements." It might be remarked in passing that the belief that
economic sanctions could be used without a backing of military force, or the possibility
of needing such backing, is the one sure sign of a novice in foreign politics, and Robert
Cecil could never be called a novice in such matters. In the speech itself he said:
“The most important step we can now take is to devise machinery which, in case of
international dispute, will, at the least, delay the outbreak of war, and secure full and
open discussion of the causes of the quarrel. For that purpose . . . all that would be
necessary would be a treaty binding the signatories never to wage war themselves or
permit others to wage war till a formal conference of nations had been held to enquire
into, and, if possible, decide the dispute. It is probably true, at least in theory, that
decisions would be difficult to obtain, for the decisions of such a conference, like all
other international proceedings, would have to be unanimous to be binding. But since the
important thing is to secure delay and open discussion, that is to say, time to enable
public opinion to act and information to instruct it, this is not a serious objection to the
proposal. Indeed, from one point of view, it is an advantage, since it avoids any
interference with national sovereignty except the interposition of a delay in seeking
redress by force of arms. This is the essential thing.... To that extent, and to that extent
only, international coercion would be necessary.”
This speech of Cecil's was approved by
point of view in the issue of December 1918. At the same time, through Smuts, the
Milner Group published another statement of its views. This pamphlet, called
read in manuscript and criticized by the inner circle, especially Curtis. This statement