peculiar in this attitude. It is merely, we repeat, the broad reflex of an attitude already
taken up by all the European Allies in questions where their national interests are
affected, and also by the British Dominions in their relations with the British
Government. It gives us a statement in plain English, of the limitations to the ideal of
international action which none of the other Allies will, in practice, dispute. So far,
therefore, from destroying the League of Nations, the American reservations have
rendered it the great service of pointing clearly to the flaws which at present neutralize its
worth.”
Among these flaws, in the opinion of the Milner Croup, was the fact that their plan to
use the League of Nations as a method of tying the Dominions more closely to the United
Kingdom had failed and, instead, the Covenant
“gave the Dominions the grounds, or rather the excuse, to avoid closer union with the
United Kingdom.... It had been found in Paris that in order to preserve its unity the
British delegation must meet frequently as a delegation to discuss its policy before
meeting the representatives of foreign nations in conference. How was this unity of action
to be maintained after the signature of peace without committing the Dominion
Governments to some new constitutional organization within the Commonwealth? And if
some new constitutional organization were to be devised for this purpose, how could it
fail to limit in some way the full national independent status which the Dominion
Governments had just achieved by their recognition as individual members of the League
of Nations? The answer to these questions was found in cooperation within the League,
which was to serve, not only as the link between the British Empire and foreign Powers,
but as the link also between the constituent nations of the British Empire itself. Imbued
with this idea, the Dominion statesmen accepted obligations to foreign Powers under the
Covenant of the League more binding than any obligations which they would undertake
to their kindred nations within the British Empire. In other words, they mortgaged their
freedom of action to a league of foreign States in order to avoid the possibility of
mortgaging it to the British Government. It hardly required the reservations of the
American Senate to demonstrate the illusory character of this arrangement.... The British
Dominions have made no such reservations with regard to the Covenant, and they are
therefore bound by the obligations which have been rejected by the United States.
Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand are, in fact, bound by stronger written
obligations to Poland and Czechoslovakia, than to the British Isles.... It is almost needless
to observe that none of the democracies of the British Empire has grasped the extent of its
obligations to the League of Nations or would hesitate to repudiate them at once, if put to
the test. If England were threatened by invasion, the other British democracies would
mobilize at once for her support; but though they have a written obligation to Poland,
which they have never dreamed of giving to England, they would not in practice mobilize
a single man to defend the integrity of the Corridor to Danzig or any other Polish
territorial interest.... This is a dangerous and equivocal situation.... It is time that our
democracies reviewed and corrected it with the clearness of vision and candour of
statement displayed by the much-abused Senate of the United States.... To what course of
action do these conclusions point? They point in the first place to revision of our
obligations under the League. We are at present pledged to guarantees of territorial
arrangements in Europe which may be challenged at any time by forces too powerful for
diplomatic control, and it is becoming evident that in no part of the Empire would public
opinion sanction our active interference in the local disputes which may ensue. The
Polish Corridor to Danzig is a case in point.... Our proper course is to revise and restate
our position towards the League in accordance with these facts.... First, we wish to do our
utmost to guarantee peace, liberty, and 18w throughout the world without committing
ourselves to quixotic obligations to foreign States. Second, we wish to assist and develop
the simple mechanism of international dealing embodied in the League without
mortgaging our freedom of action and judgment under an international Covenant. Our
policy toward the League should, therefore, be revised on the following guiding lines: 1.
We should state definitely that our action within the League will be governed solely by
our own judgment of every situation as it arises, and we must undertake no general
obligations which we may not be able or willing, when the test comes, to discharge. 2.
We must in no case commit ourselves to responsibilities which we cannot discharge to
the full with our own resources, independent of assistance from any foreign power. 3. We