America, which had been organized by the associates of J. P. Morgan and Company
before the First World War, and which made its most intimate connections with the
Milner Group at the Peace Conference of 1919. We have already mentioned this
American group in connection with the Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute of
Pacific Relations. Through this connection, many of the activities and propaganda
effusions of the Milner Group were made available to a wide public in America. We have
already mentioned the February 1923 issue of
monopolized by the Group. A few other examples might be mentioned. Both of General
Smuts's important speeches, that of 23 October 1923 and that of 13 November 1934,
were reproduced in
Minorities" by Wilson Harris. This was in the September 1926 issue. A
22 November 1926 on "The Empire as It Is" was reprinted in March 1927; another of 14
July 1934 is in the September issue of the same year; a third of 12 July 1935 is in the
issue of September 1935. Brand's report on Germany's Foreign Creditors' Standstill
Agreements is in the May issue of 1932; while a long article from the same pen on "The
Gold Problem" appears in the October 1937 issue. This article was originally published,
over a period of three days, in
1939 and of 11 December 1940 were both printed in the issues of
or No League," first published in
periodical under consideration in December 1936. An article by Lord Cecil on
disarmament, another by Clarence Streit (one of the few American members of the
Group) on the League of Nations, and a third by Stephen King-Hall on the Mediterranean
problem were published in December 1932, February 1934, and January 1938
respectively. A speech of John Simon's appears in the issue of May 1935; one of Samuel
Hoare's is in the September issue of the same year; another by Samuel Hoare is in the
issue of November 1935. Needless to say, the activities of the Institute of Pacific
Relations, of the Imperial Conferences, of the League of Nations, and of the various
international meetings devoted to reparations and disarmament were adequately reflected
in the pages of
The deep dislike which the Milner Group felt for the Treaty of Versailles and the
League of Nations was shared by the French, but for quite opposite reasons. The French
felt insecure in the face of Germany because they realized that France had beaten
Germany in 1918 only because of the happy fact that she had Russia, Great Britain, Italy,
and the United States to help her. From 1919 onward, France had no guarantee that in any
future attack by Germany she would have any such assistance. To be sure, the French
knew that Britain must come to the aid of France if there was any danger of Germany
defeating France. The Milner Group knew this too. But France wanted some arrangement
by which Britain would be alongside France from the first moment of a German attack,
since the French had no assurance that they could withstand a German onslaught alone,
even for a brief period. Moreover, if they could, the French were afraid that the opening
onslaught would deliver to the Germans control of the most productive part of France as
captured territory. This is what had happened in 1914. To avoid this, the French sought in
vain one alternative after another: (a) to detach from Germany, or, at least, to occupy for
an extended period, the Rhineland area of Germany (this would put the Ruhr, the most
vital industrial area of Germany, within striking distance of French forces); (b) to get a
British-American, or at least a British, guarantee of French territory; (c) to get a "League
of Nations with teeth," that is, one with its own police forces and powers to act
automatically against an aggressor. All of these were blocked by the English and
Americans at the Peace Conference in 1919. The French sought substitutes. Of these, the
only one they obtained was a system of alliances with new states, like Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and the enlarged Rumania, on the east of Germany. All of these states
were of limited power, and the French had little faith in the effectiveness of their
assistance. Accordingly, the French continued to seek their other aims: to extend the
fifteen years' occupation of the Rhineland into a longer or even an indefinite period; to
get some kind of British guarantee; to strengthen the League of Nations by "plugging the
gaps in the Covenant"; to use the leverage of reparations and disarmament as provided in