memorandum on this conversation makes it perfectly clear that the Germans did not
misunderstand Halifax except, possibly, on the last point. There they failed to see that if
Germany made war, the British Government would be forced into the war against
Germany by public opinion in England. The German diplomatic agents in London,
especially the Ambassador, Dirksen, saw this clearly, but the Government in Berlin
listened only to the blind and conceited ignorance of Ribbentrop. As dictators themselves,
unfamiliar with the British social or constitutional systems, the German rulers assumed
that the willingness of the British Government to accept the liquidation of Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland implied that the British Government would never go to war
to prevent this liquidation. They did not see that the British Government might have to
declare war to stay in office if public opinion in Britain were sufficiently aroused. The
British Government saw this difficulty and as a last resort were prepared to declare war
but not to wage war on Germany. This distinction was not clear to the Germans and was
not accepted by the inner core of the Milner Group. It was, however, accepted by the
other elements in the government, like Chamberlain himself, and by much of the second
circle of the Milner Group, including Simon, Hoare, and probably Halifax. It was this
which resulted in the' phony war" from September 1939 to April 1940.
The memorandum on Halifax's interview, quoting the Englishman in the third person,
says in part:(10)
“In spite of these difficulties [British public opinion, the English Church, and the
Labour Party] he and other members of the British Government were fully aware that the
Führer had not only achieved a great deal inside Germany herself, but that, by destroying
Communism in his country, he had barred its road to Western Europe, and that Germany
therefore could rightly be regarded as a bulwark of the West against Bolshevism. . . .
After the ground had been prepared by an Anglo-German understanding, the four Great
West-European Powers must jointly lay the foundation for lasting peace in Europe.
Under no conditions should any of the four Powers remain outside this cooperation, or
else there would be no end to the present unstable situation.... Britons were realists and
were perhaps more than others convinced that the errors of the Versailles dictate must be
rectified. Britain always exercised her influence in this realistic sense in the past. He
pointed to Britain's role with regard to the evacuation of the Rhineland ahead of the fixed
time, the settlement of the reparations problem, and the reoccupation of the Rhineland....
He therefore wanted to know the Fuhrer's attitude toward the League of Nations, as well
as toward disarmament. All other questions could be characterized as relating to changes
in the European order, changes that sooner or later would probably take place. To these
questions belonged Danzig, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. England was only interested
that any alterations should be effected by peaceful evolution, so as to avoid methods
which might cause far-reaching disturbances, which were not desired either by the Fuhrer
or by other countries.... Only one country, Soviet Russia, stood to gain from a general
conflict. All others were at heart in favour of the consolidation of peace.”
That this attitude was not Halifax's personal argument but the point of view of the
government (and of the Milner Croup) is perfectly clear. On arrival, Halifax assured the
Germans that the purposes of his visit had been discussed and accepted by the Foreign
Secretary (Eden) and the Prime Minister. On 26 November 1937, one week after
Halifax's conversation with Hitler, Chamberlain wrote to his sister that he hoped to
satisfy German colonial demands by giving them the Belgian Congo and Angola in place
of Tanganyika. He then added: "I don't see why we shouldn't say to Germany, 'Give us
satisfactory assurances that you won't use force to deal with the Austrians and
Czechoslovakians, and we will give you similar assurances that we won't use force to
prevent the changes you want if you can get them by peaceful means.'" (11)
It might be noted that when John W. Wheeler-Bennett, of Chatham House and the
Milner Group, wrote his book on
relegated the last quotation to a footnote and suppressed the references to the Belgian
Congo and Angola. This, however, was an essential part of the appeasement program of
the Chamberlain group. On 3 March 1938, the British Ambassador in Berlin, Nevile
Henderson, one of the Chamberlain group, tried to persuade Hitler to begin negotiations
to carry out this plan but did not succeed. He repeated Lord Halifax's statement that
changes in Europe were acceptable to Britain if accomplished without "the free play of
forces," and stated that he personally "had often expressed himself in favour of the