placed the French Army at two-thirds the size of Germany's (which was untrue) and
Britain at no more than two or three divisions. The point of view of
not identical with that of the Chamberlain group (which intersected, through common
members, with the second circle of the Milner Group).
inner circle of the Milner Group, was not nearly so anti-Russian as the Chamberlain
group. Accordingly, it never regarded a collision between Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union as a practical solution of Europe's problems. It did accept the idea of a four-power
pact to exclude Russia from Europe, but it was not willing to allow Germany to expand
eastward as she wished. The Milner Group's misunderstanding of the Nazi system and of
Germany itself was so great that they envisioned a stable situation in which Europe was
dominated by a four-power pact, with Soviet Russia on one side and an Oceanic bloc of
the British Commonwealth and the United States on the other. The Group insisted on
rapid British rearmament and the building up of the Oceanic System because they had a
lower opinion of Britain's own powers than did the Chamberlain group (this idea was
derived from Milner) and they were not prepared to allow Germany to go eastward
indefinitely in the hope she would be satisfied by a war with Russia. As we shall see, the
policies of the Milner Group and the Chamberlain group went jointly forward, with slight
shifts of emphasis, until March 1939, when the Group began to disintegrate.
In the same article of December 1937 The Round Table said that the democracies
must
“make clear the point at which they are prepared to risk war rather than retreat....
During the last year or two
"collective security" on two main grounds: that it meant fighting to maintain an out-of-
date settlement, and that security depended, not merely on public opinion but on ability to
bring effective military superiority to bear at the critical point. On the other hand,
and if necessary defiant foreign policy at those points where we are sure that . . . we can
bring superior power effectively to bear. And for this purpose we consider that the
nations of the Commonwealth should not only act together themselves, but should also
work in the closest cooperation with all the democracies, especially the United States.”
In February 1938, Lord Lothian, "leader" of the Group, spoke in the House of Lords in
support of appeasement. This extraordinary speech was delivered in defense of the
retiring of Sir Robert Vansittart. Sir Robert, as Permanent Under Secretary in the Foreign
Office from 1930 to 1938, was a constant thorn in the side of the appeasers. The opening
of the third stage of appeasement at the end of 1937 made it necessary to get rid of him
and his objections to their policy. Accordingly, he was "promoted" to the newly created
post of Chief Diplomatic Adviser, and the Under Secretaryship was given to Sir
Alexander Cadogan of the Cecil Bloc. This action led to a debate in February 1938. Lord
Lothian intervened to insist that Sir Robert's new role would not be parallel to that of the
new Under Secretary but was restricted to advising only on "matters specifically referred
to him by the Secretary of State, and he is no longer responsible for the day to day work
of the Office." From this point, Lothian launched into a long attack on the League of
Nations, followed by a defense of Germany. In regard to the former, he expressed
satisfaction that
“the most dangerous aspect of the League of Nations—namely, the interpretation
which has habitually been put upon it by the League of Nations Union in this country—is
pretty well dead.... It seems to me that that [interpretation] is inevitably going to turn the
League of Nations itself not into an instrument for maintaining peace but into an
instrument for making war. That was not the original concept of the League at all. The
original concept of the League definitely left the way open for alteration after six months'
examination even if it meant war.... I think the League of Nations now, at last, is going to
have a chance of recovery, for the reason that this particular interpretation, which has
been its besetting sin, the one thing which has led to its failure from the beginning, is now
dead. . . . Therefore I am more hopeful of the League today than I have been for a good
long time, because it has ceased to be an instrument to try to perpetuate the status quo.”
When Lothian turned to the problem of Germany, his arguments became even more
ridiculous. "The fundamental problem of the world today is still the problem of
Germany.... Why is Germany the issue? In my view the fundamental reason is that at no
time in the years after 1919 has the rest of the world been willing to concede any