to be great. If necessary, the strategy can be carried further, by arranging for the secretary
to the Rhodes Trustees to go to America for a series of "informal discussions" with
former Rhodes Scholars, while a prominent retired statesman (possibly a former Viceroy
of India) is persuaded to say a few words at the unveiling of a plaque in All Souls or New
College in honor of some deceased Warden. By a curious coincidence, both the "informal
discussions" in America and the unveiling speech at Oxford touch on the same topical
subject.
An analogous procedure in reverse could be used for policies or books which the
Group did not approve. A cutting editorial or an unfriendly book review, followed by a
suffocating blanket of silence and neglect, was the best that such an offering could expect
from the instruments of the Milner Group. This is not easy to demonstrate because of the
policy of anonymity followed by writers and reviewers in
and
statement. When J. A. Farrer's book
and maintained that the British press, especially
Anglo-German feeling before 1909,
Headlam-Morley to review. And when Baron von Eckardstein, who was in the German
Embassy in London at the time of the Boer War, published his memoirs in 1920, the
same journal gave the book to Chirol to review, even though Chirol was an interested
party and was dealt with in a critical fashion in several passages in the book itself. Both
of these reviews were anonymous.
There is no effort here to contend that the Milner Group ever falsified or even
concealed evidence (although this charge could be made against
propagated its point of view by interpretation and selection of evidence. In this fashion it
directed policy in ways that were sometimes disastrous. The Group as a whole was made
up of intelligent men who believed sincerely, and usually intensely, in what they
advocated, and who knew that their writings were intended for a small minority as
intelligent as themselves. In such conditions there could be no value in distorting or
concealing evidence. To do so would discredit the instruments they controlled. By giving
the facts as they stood, and as completely as could be done in consistency with the
interpretation desired, a picture could be construed that would remain convincing for a
long time.
This is what was done by
unable to see that the policy of that paper was anti-German from 1895 to 1914 and as
such contributed to the worsening of Anglo-German relations and thus to the First World
War. This charge has been made by German and American students, some of them of the
greatest diligence and integrity, such as Professors Sidney B. Fay, William L. Langer,
Oron J. Hale, and others. The recent
obviously spent long hours of research in refuting these charges, and fails to see that it
has not succeeded. With the usual honesty and industry of the Milner Group, the historian
gives the evidence that will convict him, without seeing that his interpretation will not
hold water. He confesses that the various correspondents of
up all anti-English actions and statements and played down all pro-English ones; that
they quoted obscure and locally discredited papers in order to do this; that all
foreign correspondents in Berlin, Paris, Vienna, and elsewhere were anti-German, and
that these were the ones who were kept on the staff and promoted to better positions; that
the one member of the staff who was recognized as being fair to Germany (and who was
unquestionably the most able man in the whole
Wallace, was removed as head of the Foreign Department and shunted off to be editor of
the supplementary volumes of the
Germany. All of this is admitted and excused as the work of honest, if hasty, journalists,
and the crowning proof that
that the Germans did ultimately get into a war with Britain, thus proving at one stroke
that they were a bad lot and that the attitude of
by the event.
It did not occur to the historian of
Anglo-German relations, namely that in 1895 there were two Germanies—the one
admiring Britain and the other hating Britain—and that Britain, by her cold-blooded and