Anglo-American Establishment полностью

the incrimination of Joseph Chamberlain, who clearly knew of the plot. Milner, Garrett,

Stead, and Esher discussed possible defenses and reached no conclusion, since Stead

wanted to admit that Chamberlain was implicated in plans for a raid but not plans for the

raid. By this, Stead meant that Chamberlain and Rhodes had seen the possibility of an

uprising in the Transvaal and, solely as a precautionary measure, had made the

preparations for Jameson's force so that it would be available to go to Johannesburg to

restore order. The others refused to accept this strategy and insisted on the advantages of

a general and blanket denial. This difference of opinion probably arose from the fact that

Stead did not know that the prospective rebels in Johannesburg were armed and financed

by Rhodes, were led by Rhodes's brother and Abe Bailey, and had written the"women

and children" message, in collaboration with Jameson, weeks before. These facts, if

revealed to the committee, would make it impossible to distinguish between "the raid"

and "a raid." The event of 31 December 1895, which the committee was investigating,

was the former and not the latter merely because the plotters in Johannesburg failed to

revolt on schedule. This is clear from Edward Cook's statement, in his biography of

Garrett, that Garrett expected to receive news of a revolution in Johannesburg at any

moment on 30 December 1895. (9)

The difficulty which the initiates in London had in preparing a defense for the Select

Committee was complicated by the fact that they were not able to reach Rhodes, who was

en route from South Africa with Garrett. As soon as the boat docked, Brett (Lord Esher)

sent "Natty" Rothschild from London with a message from Chamberlain to Rhodes.

When Rothschild returned, Brett called in Stead, and they discussed the projected

defense. Stead had already seen Rhodes and given his advice.(10) The following day (5

February 1896), Brett saw Rhodes and found that he was prepared to confess everything.

Brett tried to dissuade him. As he wrote in his Journal, "I pointed out to him that there

was one consideration which appeared to have escaped him, that was the position of Mr.

Chamberlain, the Secretary of State. Chamberlain was obviously anxious to help and it

would not do to embarrass him or to tie his hands. It appeared to me to be prudent to

endeavour to ascertain how Chamberlain would receive a confidence of this kind. I said I

would try to find out. On leaving me he said, 'Wish we could get our secret society.'"

Brett went to Chamberlain, who refused to receive Rhodes's confession, lest he have to

order the law officers to take proceedings against Rhodes as against Jameson.

Accordingly, the view of the majority, a general denial, was adopted and proved

successful, thanks to the leniency of the members of the Select Committee. Brett

recognized this leniency. He wrote to Stead on 19 February 1897: "I came up with Milner

from Windsor this morning. He has a heavy job; and has to start de novo. The committee

will leave few of the old gang on their legs. Alas. Rhodes was a pitiful object. Harcourt

very sorry for him; too sorry to press his question home. Why did Rhodes try to shuffle

after all we had told him?"(11)

It is clear that the Select Committee made no real effort to uncover the real

relationships between the conspirators, The Times, and the Salisbury government. When

witnesses refused to produce documents or to answer questions, the committee did not

insist, and whole fields of inquiry were excluded from examination by the committee.

One of these fields, and probably the most important one, was the internal policies and

administration of The Times itself. As a result, when Campbell-Bannerman, an opposition

leader, asked if it were usual practice for The Times correspondents to be used to

propagate certain policies in foreign countries as well as to obtain information, Miss

Shaw answered that she had been excused from answering questions about the internal

administration of The Times. We now know, as a result of the publication of the official

History of The Times, that all Miss Shaw's acts were done in consultation with the

manager, Moberly Bell.(12) The vital telegrams to Rhodes, signed by Miss Shaw, were

really drafted by Bell. As The History of The Times puts it, "Bell had taken the risk of

allowing Miss Shaw to commit The Times to the support of Rhodes in a conspiracy that

was bound to lead to controversy at home, if it succeeded, and likely to lead to

prosecution if it failed. The conspiracy had failed; the prosecution had resulted. Bell's

only salvation lay in Miss Shaw's willingness to take personal responsibility for the

telegrams and in her ability to convince the Committee accordingly." And, as the

evidence of the same source shows, in order to convince the committee it was necessary

for Miss Shaw to commit perjury, even though the representatives of both parties on the