You have brought up doubt that the Greater Manchurians intend to use the missiles. We share your troubled feelings, Yoshidasan. This will be the weightiest decision made by our nation since the preventive strike on the Americans at Pearl Harbor, and you are correct that it should be considered cautiously. But let me add that in war, or a prelude to war, there is much uncertainty. Allow me to liken this most serious matter to a chess game in which the playing board is partially obscured. Or to a game of poker in which the opponent’s entire hand is obscured. We have peeked under the handkerchief hiding the board. Minister. We have seen several of our opponent’s cards. We know things about him while he knows little about us. We must not waste this advantage. “However, let me address one of your concerns. That of the reaction of Greater Manchuria should we attack their missiles. We have discussed a covert attack, and letting the Greater Manchurians guess who did the work. We have debated, the impact of Japanese denials of Greater Manchurian accusations. We believe that if Greater Manchuria cried to the Western press about being attacked by Japan, the West would turn against us, in war as well as in commerce. And so far there have been no solutions to these problems. You do not want to attack Greater Manchuria’s territory because they have not attacked us. We are worried that after the attack Greater Manchuria may use evidence of the strike against Japan. I have an answer to both problems. “We should commission a diplomatic mission to go along with the strike. Minister Yoshida, your ambassador to Greater Manchuria — what is his name?”
“Nakamoto.”
“Of course. Your Ambassador Nakamoto goes to President Len and tells him that Japan knows of his nuclear missiles and believes them to be offensive. Len will deny this. Nakamoto will say that Len must sign a nonaggression treaty with Japan in which Japan will control the missiles. Len will refuse. Nakamoto will demand that a Japanese military detail must be put in Tamga to oversee the depot and control the missiles. Len will again refuse. At this point the diplomatic delegation will depart to call Tokyo. That is when the strike will be executed. The diplomatic delegation will gather data transmitted by Tokyo and once the strike is a success, will meet again with Len. He will be shown the film of the bombing from the missile target camera. His own people will confirm for him what happened at Tamga. Nakamoto will tell Len that his refusal to help us led to the strike. But now Nakamoto will also tell him that Japan will keep the strike a secret — so that the missiles remain a deterrent to his immediate neighbors. In exchange, Japan and Greater Manchuria will sign the nonaggression treaty that he initially refused to sign. In the end,
Japan has been honorable, telling Greater Manchuria what is desired, only attacking when there is no hope. After the attack, Japan offers to help Greater Manchuria keep her neighbors at bay. Nakamoto will offer to help Len build up his conventional military by selling him hardware at a special discount. “As you can see, all parties win. The missiles will be destroyed, putting us at ease. Japan’s honor remains intact, since we offered a diplomatic solution that was refused, leaving us no choice but a military strike. After the strika, the outstretched hand of Japan helping Greater Manchuria will transform a threat into an ally. In the years to follow. Greater Manchuria may well thank the heavens for the day we attacked Tamga.”
“Mr. Prime Minister,” Yoshida said, “if we use diplomacy we may well succeed where General Gotoh has predicted failure.
If Greater Manchuria sees logic they will agree to the nonaggression treaty and Japanese control of the nuclear missiles. If that happens, we can avoid this horrible military attack.”
“Gentlemen? General Gotoh?”
“Minister Yoshida, if Len Pei Poom signed a treaty that put those missiles under Japanese military control I will withdraw my motion for the strike. With one condition: that if the Greater Manchurians dissemble, if we suddenly lose communication with the missile-guarding detail, that the strike be executed. I must say that the chances of Len accepting Japanese Self Defense Force personnel at his secret missile depot, with the Japanese in control, is minimal. I do not think he will agree to it.”
“But if he does, we must be prepared to stick to the terms of our own treaty,” Yoshida said. “I don’t want us to demand he sign a treaty and then watch us refuse to sign it ourselves. If our ambassador goes to Len with a peace treaty in hand I must know that Japan will be willing to live by its terms.”
