Hitler had meanwhile changed his mind about delivering his Reichstag speech on the Monday. On 3 July British ships had sunk a number of French warships moored at the naval base of Mers-el-Kébir, near Oran, in French Algeria, killing 1,250 French sailors in the process. Churchill’s move, a show of British determination, was to prevent the battle-fleet of his former allies falling into Hitler’s hands.111 For Hitler, this brought a new situation. He wanted to await developments. He was uncertain whether he ought to go ahead and appeal to England.112 When Ciano met him the day after Hitler had returned to Berlin, the Italian Foreign Minister found him ‘rather inclined to continue the struggle and to unleash a storm of wrath and of steel upon the British’. However, Ciano added, ‘the final decision has not been reached, and it is for this reason that he is delaying his speech, of which, as he himself puts it, he wants to weigh every word.’113 He was to postpone his speech three times — an indication of his uncertainty about how to proceed at this crucial time — before finally scheduling it for the 19th.114 ‘Despite everything the Führer still has a very positive attitude towards England,’ remarked Goebbels. ‘He is still not ready for the final blow. He wants to think over his speech again in peace and for that reason go to the Obersalzberg.’ If London should refuse the last offer, then Britain would be ‘immediately following dealt an annihilatory blow. The English apparently have no idea what then awaits them.’115
While he was at the Berghof, Hitler had talks with his military leaders about a possible invasion of Britain, should his ‘peace offer’ be rejected. At these discussions, an invasion was still seen as a last choice rather than first option. Raeder, reporting on a study that the naval leadership had been conducting since the previous November, had on his own initiative already as early as 21 May, during the early stages of the western offensive, raised with Hitler the possibility of a landing.116 They had spoken again on 20 June about it, and Hitler had briefly also discussed the matter with Brauchitsch.117 The Wehrmacht had officially learned on 2 July of Hitler’s decision that under certain conditions a landing in Britain could be undertaken.118 Raeder had advised Hitler in June that a naval landing could only take place once the Luftwaffe had secured air superiority over southern England.119 He repeated this precondition when he met Hitler on 11 July on the Obersalzberg, advocating ‘concentrated bombing’ to begin forthwith. But naval ambitions went far beyond a presumed British surrender, thus obviating the need for what Raeder, as well as Hitler, saw as the risky venture of invading Britain. Germany would need a big navy to defend its colonial empire, in particular against the looming threat of the United States.120 Taking the opportunity to push the interests of the navy, Raeder held out, therefore, the prospect of building up a great battleship fleet to combat any potential Anglo-American naval alliance.121 The next day Jodl outlined for Hitler initial thoughts on operational plans for a landing.122 On Saturday, 13 July, it was Halder’s turn to travel to the Berghof to report on operational plans.123 But a landing was to be a last resort. ‘The Führer is greatly puzzled by England’s persisting unwillingness to make peace,’ Halder noted. ‘He sees the answer (as we do) in England’s hope in Russia and therefore counts on having to compel her by main force to agree to peace. Actually that is much against his grain. The reason is that a military defeat of England will bring about the disintegration of the British Empire.’ As Halder recorded, Hitler reiterated what he had told Goebbels and others. ‘This would not be of any benefit to Germany. German blood would be shed to accomplish something that would benefit only Japan, the United States, and others.’124
The talk was only of England at this time. Hitler regretted that he had not done more to ‘sign up’
