Franco had opportunistically looked to join the Axis in mid-June, counting on spoils in a war about to be won (as it seemed). He wanted Gibraltar, French Morocco, and Oran, the former Spanish province currently in French Algeria. There was at the time every reason for Hitler to avoid acting on proposals that could have jeopardized the armistice. In September, a diplomatic balancing-act to ensure the support for the Mediterranean strategy of France, Spain, and Italy now appeared desirable and timely. Ribbentrop and Ramon Serrano Suñer, Franco’s brother-in-law and personal emissary, soon to be the Spanish Foreign Minister, met in Berlin on
Before that, on 4 October, Hitler met Mussolini again — as in March, at the Brenner. Ribbentrop, feeling unwell and uncharacteristically quiet, and Ciano were also present. Hitler attributed the British prolongation of the war, despite extensive German bombing, to the hope of American intervention and Russian aid. He thought the Tripartite Pact had reduced the risk of the former, and that the German troops moved to the eastern border were a deterrent to Stalin. Hitler raised the question of Spanish intervention, outlining Franco’s demands. He indicated Germany’s need for a base in Morocco, before attaining her own colonies in western Africa. Conceding the territorial demands of Franco (apart from Gibraltar), he went on, might provoke English occupation of the Canaries and the adhesion of North Africa to the Gaullist movement. Natural enemy of the Axis though she was, he did not rule out the possibility of gaining France for the anti-British coalition. Mussolini agreed on the stance to be taken towards Spain, reaffirming Italian demands of France to cede Nice, Corsica, Tunis, and Djibouti — claims in effect placed in cold storage at the armistice.263 Ciano drew the conclusions from the meeting that the proposed landing in Britain would not take place, that the aim was now to win over France to the anti-British coalition, since Britain was proving more difficult to defeat than anticipated, and that the Mediterranean sector had, to Italy’s advantage, won greater significance. Hitler, in Ciano’s view, had also shown himself once more extremely anti-Bolshevik.264
The meeting had been cordial. But eight days later Mussolini’s patience was stretched once more when he heard, without prior warning, that a German military commission had been dispatched to Bucharest and that the Germans were taking over the defence of the Romanian oil-fields. Mussolini’s retaliation was to order the invasion of Greece for the end of the month, to present Hitler this time with a
On 20 October Hitler, accompanied by Ribbentrop, set out in his Special Train for southern France, bound first of all for a meeting, two days later, with Pierre Laval, Pétain’s deputy and foreign minister in the Vichy regime. This proved encouraging. Laval, full of unctuous humility, opened up the prospect of close French collaboration with Germany, hoping for France’s reward through retention of its African possessions and release from heavy reparations — both at the expense of Great Britain — once a peace-settlement could be concluded. Hitler did not seek firm details. Leaving no doubt that some African possessions would fall to Germany after the war, he was content to offer the inducement that the ease of terms for France would depend on the extent of French cooperation and rapidity with which the defeat of Britain could be attained. He extended an invitation to talks to Marshal Pétain, which Laval swiftly agreed to arrange.267
