38. TBJG, I/2, 607 (3 May 1936).
39. See TBJG, I/2, 701 (20 October 1936): ‘Die Energie bringt er mit, ob auch die wirtschaftl. Kenntnis und Erfahrung? Wer weiß! Immerhin wind er viel Wind machen.’ After the war, Goring himself acknowledged that it had been his task, in confronting the raw-materials difficulties, to deploy his energy ‘not as an expert, but as a driving-force {Treiber)’ (IMG, ix.319).
40. Höhne, 379; Petzina, 44–5; Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology. IG Farben in the Nazi Era, Cambridge, 1987, 150ff.; DRZW, i.278ff.
41. Höhne, 380; Berenice Carroll, Design for Total War. Arms and Economics in the Third Reich, The Hague/Paris, 1968, ch.7.
42. Cit. Kube, 152.
43. Kube, 152–3; Höhne, 380.
44. See Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Ökonomie und Klassenstruktur des deutschen Faschismus, Frankfurt am Main, 1973, 139–41, for Göring’s reminders to Hitler in autumn 1935 about his coming war against the Soviet Union.
45. Marquess of Londonderry (Charles S. H. Vane-Tempest-Stewart), Ourselves and Germany, London, 1938, 94–103. Lord Londonderry’s personal papers in the Public Record Office, Belfast, contain a description of his visit to Germany (D3099/2/19/8, 9A-9B), but deal only in the briefest terms with his interview with Hitler. The account which formed the basis for his printed comments appears to be missing from the file. In the audience he granted Londonderry, Hitler was, of course, trying to impress upon his guest the need for Britain to develop close links with Germany. (As the Londonderry papers show, the German leadership greatly overestimated his influence at the time within Britain.) But this does not meant that Hitler’s feelings about Bolshevism were not genuine. In fact, Londonderry was little moved by them, pointing out that the Bolshevik danger was seen as far less important in Britain. He was more interested in the colonial question. On the Londonderry visit, see also Schmidt, 338–42.
46. TBJG, I/2.622 (9 June 1936).
47. TBJG, I/2.644 (17 July 1936).
48. Nicholas Mosley, Beyond the Pale: Sir Oswald Mosley, 19 33–1980, London, 1983, 72. On the Mitford sisters, see Robert Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, London, 1981, 340–41; and Richard Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the Right. British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany, 1933–9, London, 1980, 171ff.
49. TBJG, I/2, 646 (22 July 1936). Goebbels found the Mitfords ‘boring as ever’ (I/2, 646 (21 July 1936)).
50. See Paul Preston, Franco. A Biography, London, 1993, 159; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, National-sozialistische Außenpolitik 1933–1938, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 1968, 422–4.
51. Höhne, 356–7.
52. Preston, I28ff.
53. Preston, 140–58.
54. Kube, 163–6. And see Weinberg I, 289–90.
55. Kube, 164.
56. Hans-Henning Abendroth, ‘Deutschlands Rolle im Spanischen Bürgerkrieg’, in Manfred Funke (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte. Materialien zur Außenpolitik des Dritten Reiches, Dusseldorf, 1978, 471–88, here 472–3; Preston, 158–9.
57. Abendroth, 474.
58. DGFP, D, III, 10–11, No.10, Memorandum of the Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office, Dr Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff, 25 July 1936. According to Kube, 164, Bohle and Heß tried to take up the matter with the Foreign Office, and almost certainly, too, with Göring.
59. Abendroth, 474.
60. DGFP, D, III, 6–7, N0.4; Abendroth, 474–5.
61. Implied in the account of Kube, 164–5.
62. Abendroth, 475.
63. Kube, 165, n.11.
64. See Abendroth, 476–9.
65. Suggested by Martens, 66.
66. Preston, 159.
