264. Friedrich Hoßbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934–1938, Wolfenbüttel/Hanover, 1949, 219; Wright/Stafford, 82, for the second part of the meeting dealing with rearmament questions. Following the discussion of the raw materials issue, new allocations to the navy were agreed. Instead of 45,000 tons of steel, the navy would receive its full complement of 75,000 tons. (Dülffer, Marine, 447; Hoßbach, 219; Weinberg II, 41; Wright/Stafford, 123 n.200 on Hitler speaking from notes.)
265. Walter Bußmann, ‘Zur Entstehung und Überlieferung der “Hoßbach-Niederschrift”’, VfZ, 16 (1968), 373–84, here 377; Wright/Stafford, 82.
266. IMG, xxv, 402–13, Doc. 386-PS. Hoßbach, 217–20, relates how he made the notes on the meeting. And see Müller, Heer, 243ff.; Müller, Beck, 249ff.; Dülffer, Marine, 448–51; Hermann Gakenholz, ‘Reichskanzlei 5. November 1937’, in Richard Dietrich and Gerhard Oestreich (eds.), Forschungen zu Staat und Verfassung. Festgabe für Fritz Hartung, Berlin, 1958, 459–74. Bußmann, Wright/Stafford, and Bradley F. Smith, ‘Die Überlieferung der Hoßbach-Niederschrift im Lichte neuer Quellen’, VfZ, 38 (1990), 329–36, have removed any doubts about the authenticity of the document.
267. See Wright/Stafford, 84.
268. See Weinberg II, 39 n.74 for the generally understood notion that Austria would be taken over from the outside, and Papen’s comments to a Hungarian minister in Vienna in May that both Austria and Czechoslovakia would disappear. Hitler’s view that little was to be gained at that time by a rapprochement with Britain, and his strong preference for close ties with Italy, figured in the confidential reports on press briefings by Georg Dertinger and Dr Hans Joachim Kausch. See Wright/Stafford, 91–5.
269. Wright/Stafford, 82–4.
270. Hoßbach, 219; Müller, Heer, 244; Wright/Stafford, 85.
271. Bussmann, 378.
272. Weinberg II, 39.
273. Müller, Beck, 501.
274. IMG, xxv. 412–13; Müller, Heer, 244; Wright/Stafford, 99; Gackenholz, 469–72. Hoßbach, 219, recalled that the meeting became heated in the exchanges between Blomberg and Fritsch on the one hand and Göring on the other, with Hitler saying little. According to Müller, 244 (though without source for the assertion), the discussion with Göring concerned above all the technical questions of armaments issues. In Hoßbach’s record of the meeting, Göring’s only intervention was to suggest cutting down Germany’s military involvement in Spain in the light of Hitler’s comments (IMG, XXV.413).
275. Wright/Stafford, 99.
276. Wright/Stafford, 103.
277. IMG, xiv, 44–5; Erich Raeder, Mein Leben von 1935 bis Spandau 1955, Tübingen/Neckar, 1957, 149–50; Müller, Heer, 245; Dülffer, 450 n.56. But Raeder’s testimony at Nuremberg and his memoirs are often unreliable (Dülffer, Marine, 450 n.56; Weinberg II, 40; Wright/Stafford, 101, 107; Gackenholz, 470). Göring, Raeder claimed, had told him before the meeting that Hitler’s remarks were solely aimed at stirring the army to speed up rearmament. (Göring also declared at Nuremberg that this was the purpose of the meeting (Wright/Stafford, 77).) He was expecting, therefore, some exaggeration for effect.
278. Müller, Heer, 246 n.193.
279. Müller, Beck, 254.
280. Müller, Beck, 498–501 (text), 254–61 (commentary).
281. Gackenholz, 471; Müller, Heer, 246.
282. Müller, Heer, 247 (Neufassung des Aufmarschplanes ‘Grün’, 21 December 1937). Blomberg stated after the war that he and Fritsch had wanted to express their doubts about the possibility of implementing Hitler’s plans in the light of the opposition of Britain and France, but added that those present at the meeting agreed when leaving the room that Hitler’s remarks were not to be taken seriously (IMG, xl, 406). This was probably an indirect reference to an exchange of views with Raeder, who was of the same opinion.
283. Karl-Heinz Janßen and Fritz Tobias, Der Sturz der Generäle. Hitler und die Blomberg–Fritsch-Krise 1938, Munich, 1994, 38; Speer, 83.
284. Janßen/Tobias, 35. For the film Hitlerjunge Quex, see Welch, 59—74.
285. Janßen/Tobias, 59–60.
286. Janßen/Tobias, 34–5.
287. Janßen/Tobias, 16. At the end of 1944, Blomberg was to send Hitler a letter expressing his disgust and shame at the military plot against him (TBJG, II/14, 333 (2 December 1944)).
288. Janßen/Tobias, 30.
289. Janßen/Tobias, 38–41.
290. Janßen/Tobias, 27–8.
291. Janßen/Tobias, 56–7 (where it is convincingly argued that the call did not come from the Gestapo, as often presumed).
292. Janßen/Tobias, 45–7, 51.
293. Janßen/Tobias, 27, 51–2.
294. Wiedemann, 112.
295. TBJG, I/3, 414 (26 January 1938).
296. Hoßbach, 124.
297. TBJG, I/3, 415–16 (27 January 1938).
298. Janßen/Tobias, 54–5; TBJG, I/3,419 (29 January 1938).
