176. For Beck, see above all Müller, Beck, ch.6. Müller’s interpretation of Beck gave rise to strong criticism from Peter Hoffmann, ‘Generaloberst Ludwig Becks militärpolitisches Denken’, HZ, 234 (1982), 101–21, who saw in Müller’s treatment an undue emphasis on opportunism at the expense of stress on ethical motivation; and a sharp riposte from Klaus-Jürgen Müller, ‘Militärpolitik nicht Militäropposition!’, HZ, 235 (1982), 355–71. For Canaris, see Heinz Höhne, Canaris — Patriot im Zwielicht, Munich, 1976.
177. On Weizsäcker, see Rainer A. Blasius, Für Großdeutschland — gegen den großen Krieg. Staatssekretär Ernst Freiherr von Weizsäcker in den Krisen um die Tschechoslowakei und Polen 1938/39, Cologne/Vienna, 1981; and Rainer A. Blasius, ‘Weizsäcker kontra Ribbentrop: “München” statt des großen Krieges’, in Knipping and Müller, 93–118. As with Beck, Weizsäcker’s motives have been differently interpreted. Leonidas E. Hill, the editor of Weizsäcker’s papers, underlines the State Secretary’s emphasis on a peaceful evolution to Germany’s position as a world power (Leonidas E. Hill, ‘Alternative Politik des Auswärtigen Amtes bis zum 1. September 1939’, in Jürgen Schmädeke and Peter Steinbach (eds.), Der Wider stand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, Munich/Zurich, 1985, 664–90, here 669–78). Blasius, in contrast, stresses Weizsäcker’s affinity with Hitler’s expansionist aims, though growing opposition to a war which he is certain will bring catastrophe on Germany.
178. See Ritter, ch.10; Klemens von Klemperer, German Resistance against Hitler. The Search for Allies Abroad, 1938–1945, Oxford, 1992, 86–101; Patricia Meehan, The Unnecessary War. Whitehall and the German Resistance to Hitler, London, 1992, 86–7, 102–3, 122ff.
179. A term used by the Regierungspräsident of Niederbayern and the Oberpfalz in his report of 8 September 1938, GStA, MA 106673. The SD’s annual report for 1938 also spoke of a ‘war psychosis’ (Meldungen aus dem Reich. Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1938–45, 17 vols, ed. Heinz Boberach, Herrsching, 1984 (=MadR), ii.72–3).
180. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’ 132–9; and Auerbach, in Knipping and Müller, 28off.
181. Bloch, 175.
182. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 136; ADAP, D, II, No. 374, 473; Blasius, in Knipping, 101.
183. Henderson thought another crisis like that on 21 May would push him over the edge (DBFP, Series 3, II, Appendix 1, 649, 651, 653, and Doc.823, 284).
184. Tb Irving, 123 (20 March 1938).
185. IMG, xxviii.372.
186. Weinberg II, 318; see also 366–70; Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘The May Crisis, 1938’, JMH, 29 (1957), 213–25, especially 225; and Donald Cameron Watt, ‘Hitler’s visit to Rome and the May Weekend Crisis: A Study in Hitler’s Response to External Stimuli’, JCH, 9 (1974), 23–32 (and Weinberg’s criticism of Watt’s interpretation, in Weinberg II, 366 n.210).
187. See, for this term — derived from the analysis of Nazi rule by Franz Neumann, Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, London, 1942 (see his comments on 296, 382–3) — Peter Hüttenberger, ‘Nationalsozialistische Polykratie’, GG, 2 (1976), 417–42.
188. Müller, Heer, 327; Müller, Beck, 350–51.
189. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Armee, Politik und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1933–1945, Paderborn, 1979, 43–4.
190. Even reports from oppositional sources made plain that, while opinion was divided on the likelihood and the outcome of war, extensive nazified sections of the population remained firmly behind Hitler. (See DBS, v.684–90, report for July 1938, drawn up on 24 August 1938.)
191. Weinberg II, 328, 363–4.
192. Weinberg II, 341, 352ff.
193. Weinberg II, 322–3.
194. Weinberg II, 343.
195. Weinberg II, 348; quotation from Lord Halifax to Henderson, 19 March 1938.
196. Weinberg II, 325. For the exaggeration of grievances in German propaganda, see Gedye, 396.
197. Tb Irving, 91 (7 March 1938); and see Irving, Goebbels, 242.
198. Weinberg II, 334.
199. IMG, xxviii.372. The British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had himself ‘likened Germany to a boa constrictor that had eaten a good meal and was trying to digest the meal before taking anything else’ (cit. Weinberg II, 302).
200. ADAP, D, II, 157, No.106; and see Smelser, 217ff
201. DGFP, D, II, 242, N0.135.
