202. DGFP, D, II, 198, N0.197; Weinberg II, 335.
203. Weinberg II, 321; and see Michels, 382, for Goebbels’s propaganda during the Sudeten crisis.
204. See his views as recorded in Hoßbach’s memorandum of the meeting on 5 November 1937 (DGFP, D, I, 29–39, especially 32–4, No.19; Weinberg II, 317, 336).
205. See Hitler’s ‘Denkschrift zur Frage unserer Festungsanlagen’ of 1 July 1938 in Otto-Wilhelm Förster, Das Befestigungswesen, Neckargemünd, 1960, Anlage 13, 123–48; also John D. Heyl, ‘The Construction of the Westwall, 1938: An Exemplar for National Socialist Policymaking’, Central European History, 14 (1981), 63–78; and Weinberg II, 318.
206. See Weinberg II, 337.
207. Keitel, 182. Keitel dates the meeting to 20 April. But for the correct date of 21 April see IMG, xxv.415–18, Doc.388–PS; Domarus, 851 (and 851–2 for Schmundt’s notes); and Weinberg II, 337–8 and n.91.
208. Domarus, 851–2; Weinberg II, 338.
209. Keitel, 183; DGFP, D, II.300–303, here 300, No.175.
210. Müller, Beck, 510 (full text pp.502–12); Müller, Heer, 301ff.
211. Keitel, 184; Müller, Heer, 305.
212. Keitel, 184–5; Below, 105–6; Weinberg II, 318, 371; and see Franz W. Seidler, Fritz Todt. Baumeister des Dritten Reiches, Munich, 1986, ch.4. I am grateful to Steven F. Sage for sharing some insights into Todt and his work, which will be re-evaluated in his forthcoming study, and letting me see an unpublished paper he had compiled on Todt. The army’s planning for the Westwall had looked to the construction of large, well-provisioned underground fortresses mirroring the French Maginot Line. This clashed with Hitler’s conception of a far greater number of relatively simple fortified gun-sites and anti-tank structures, aimed heavily at deterrent effect. (See Heyl, 64–5.)
213. See Below, 106.
214. Monologe, 344 (16 August 1942).
215. Schmidt, 390; Bloch, 181.
216. Ciano, Tagebücher 1937/1938, 156–9 (entries for 3–9 May 1938); Eugen Dollmann, Dolmetscher der Diktatoren, Bayreuth, 1963, 37–8; Wiedemann, 140.
217. Schmidt, 392–3; Wiedemann, 141–2; Ciano, Tagebücher, 156, note. There are minor discrepancies between the reliable description of Schmidt and that of Wiedemann (who does not mention the performance of Aïda, and has Hitler inspecting a Nazi formation following a glittering dinner attended not by the King, but by the Crown Prince).
218. Bloch, 181.
219. Ciano, Tagebücher, 157 (entry for 6 May 1938); Bloch, 182; see also Schmidt, 394.
220. Domarus, 861; and see Schmidt, 394–5.
221. DGFP, D, I, 1108–10, No.761–2; Weinberg II, 340.
222. DGFP, D, I, 1110, No.762; Weinberg II, 309.
223. Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn, Pol.2a 1 (6936), Bd.16, Deutsch-italienische pol. Beziehungen, Jan.-Sept. 1938. (‘Was sudetendeutsche Frage anlangt, so ergaben Unterhaltungen ohne weiteres, daß Italiener für unsere Anteilnahme am sudetendeutschen Schicksal Verständnis haben.’)
224. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 127–8.
225. See the accounts in Bloch, 183–5; Weinberg II, 367–9; Weinberg, ‘May Crisis’, and Watt, ‘Hitler’s Visit to Rome’.
226. Boris Celovsky, Das Münchener Abkommen 1938, Stuttgart, 1958, 209 and n.2.
227. Schmidt, 395–6.
228. DBFP, Ser.3,1, 332–3, 341, Nos.250, 264.
229. DGFP, D, II, 315–17, No.186.
230. Bloch,185.
231. Bloch, 185; Weinberg II, 369.
232. IMG, xxviii.372. For the suggestion that the timing of Hitler’s order of 30 May was not caused by the May Crisis, but rested on his deliberations of 20 April, see Weinberg II, 366, and 337 n.87, and 370 n.219, for the dating of Jodl’s diary entry to June-July.
233. Keitel, 185 (on Hitler’s return to Berlin; he brings it in direct relation with new directions for ‘Green’). See also Hitler’s public statements, indicating his response to the ‘Czech provocation’, in speeches on 12 September 1938 and 30 January 1939 (Domarus, 868–9).
234. Wilhelm Treue (ed.), ‘Rede Hitlers vor der deutschen Presse (10. November 1938)’, VfZ, 6 (1958), 175–91, here 183.
235. Wiedemann, 126; Dülffer, Marine, Düsseldorf, 1973, 466.
