Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis полностью

337. TBJG, I/6, 103 (21 September 1938).

338. Schmidt, 407.

339. Shirer, 113. For references to Hitler as the ‘carpet-biter’ in the middle of the war, see Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 187.

340. Schmidt, 407–9.

341. Schmidt, 409–11.

342. Schmidt, 412.

343. TBJG, I/6, 105 (22 September 1938).

344. Schmidt, 412.

345. Schmidt, 413–14.

346. TBJG, I/6, 113 (26 September 1938).

347. See Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 184; Weizsäcker-Papiere, 143.

348. Below’s recollection differed somewhat. According to his later account, Hitler did not believe that the Czechs would fall into line with British and German demands. Therefore, he would continue with Plan Green, aimed at the occupation of the whole of Czechoslovakia. Hitler had told his military leaders that this would be his favourite solution. The talks with Chamberlain had confirmed his impression that Britain and France would not intervene militarily. (Below, 126.)

349. Weinberg II, 449.

350. Schmidt, 415; Henderson, 159; DBFP, Ser.3, II, 554–7 (quotation, 555), No.1118, where Kirkpatrick’s note reads: ‘If France and England decided to strike, let them strike. He did not care a farthing.’

351. Domarus, 933, has 20,000; Shirer, 116, has 15,000.

352. Shirer, 116.

353. TBJG, I/6, 116 (27 September 1938).

354. Domarus, 928.

355. Domarus, 930–32.

356. Domarus, 932 (and see also 927).

357. Domarus, 932.

358. Domarus, 932–3; Shirer, 116–17.

359. Henderson, 160; Schmidt, 416–17.

360. Henderson, 160; Schmidt, 417.

361. Schmidt, 416.

362. Henderson, 160–61; Groscurth, 125–6, n.130–31 (for Weizsäcker’s authorship); Schmidt, 417; Weinberg, II, 451 and n.294 for the timing of the decision to write to Chamberlain being taken before the military demonstration that afternoon; DGFP, D, II, 966–8, No.635; DBFP, Ser.3, II, 576–8, No.1144.

363. Henderson, 161.

364. Below, 127.

365. Shirer, 117; and see Wiedemann, 175–6.

366. TBJG, I/6, 119 (29 September 1938).

367. Below, 127.

368. Schmidt, 417; Shirer, 117. See also Weizsäcker-Papiere, 145; Engel, 39–40; Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin. Ein deutscbes Tagebuch, Munich, 1962, 5–6; and Marlis Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen. Stimmung und Haltung der deutscben Bevölkerung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Düsseldorf/Vienna, 1970, 77–9.

369. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 170.

370. Groscurth, 125 (27 September 1938) and n.127.

371. Himmler, as Weizsäcker subsequently implied, also favoured war. (See Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen 191.) The growth of his SS empire was predicated upon German expansion. But his involvement in foreign-policy deliberations was minimal.

372. Groscurth, 128 (28 September 1938).

373. Kube, 273–5.

374. Neville Chamberlain, The Struggle for Peace, London, 1939, 275; Groscurth, 125 n.129.

375. Chamberlain, 299; Schmidt, 420.

376. Henderson, 162–3.

377. DBFP, Ser.3, II, 587, no.1159; Feiling, 372–3.

378. Henderson, 162.

379. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 186–7.

380. Henderson, 162–3.

381. Schmidt, 418.

382. Henderson, 163; TBJG, I/6, 119 (29 September 1938).

383. André François-Poncet, Als Botschafter im Dritten Reich. Die Erinnerungen des französischen Botschafters in Berlin September 1931 bis Oktober 1938, Mainz/Berlin, 1980, 378; Schmidt, 418–19.

384. Schmidt, 420; Henderson, 164.

385. Schmidt, 420.

386. Henderson, 164.

387. TBJG, I/6, 119 (29 September 1938).

388. Henderson, 164–6; DBFP, 3rd Ser., II. 597, No.1180; Weinberg II, 453–6 for the diplomatic background to Mussolini’s decision. Goebbels [TBJG, I/6, 119 (29 September 1938)] mistakenly remarks that the idea for the Four-Power Conference was Hitler’s.