101. Schroeder, 88; Below, 153–4; Schneider, Nr.47, 21 November 1952, 8; TBJG, I/6, 293 (20 March 1939), where Goebbels noted that Hitler thought the people of Prague had ‘behaved quite neutrally’, and that more could not have been expected of them.
102. Schroeder, 88–9.
103. Reichsgesetzblatt (=RGBl) 1939,I, 485–8, quotation 485; Below, 154.
104. Below, 154.
105. TBJG, I/6, 293 (20 March 1939); Below, 155; Domarus, 1103.
106. See Below, 154, 156.
107. StA München, NSDAP 126, report of the Kreisleiter of Aichach, Upper Bavaria, 31 March 1939: ‘Die Menschen freuten sich über die großen Taten des Führers und blicken vertrauensvoll zu ihm auf. Die Nöte und Sorgen des Alltags sind aber so groß, daß bald wieder die Stimmung getrübt wird.’
108. Below, 156. Speer, 162, remarked on the depressed mood in Germany and the worries about the future. See also, for reactions to the latest coup, Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 139–40.
109. DBS, vi.279. Analysts at Sopade headquarters, by now moved from Prague to Paris, concluded that, in the light of Hitler’s broken promises and so many occasions in which to recognize the true essence of the Nazi regime, ‘If the world… allows itself to be deceived, then it alone is to blame… For this system, there is no right other than that of the stronger’ (DBS, vi.372–3).
110. Andreas-Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 32.
111. Eva Sternheim-Peters, Die Zeit der großen Täuschungen. Mädchenleben im Faschismus, Bielefeld, 1987, 361–2.
112. DBS, vi.278.
113. Chamberlain, Struggle, 413–20, quotation 418.
114. Courcy, 98.
115. Cit. Weinberg II, 542–3.
116. Weinberg II, 545–6.
117. DGFP, D, IV, 99–100, N0.81.
118. Domarus, 510–11, 1029, n.49a, 1109; Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopädie, 582; Watt, How War Came, 156.
119. See Weinberg II, 536.
120. Domarus, 1109, How War Came, 156–7.
121. TBJG, I/6, 296 (23 March 1939).
122. TBJG, I/6, 297 (23 March 1939); Domarus, 1109–10.
123. Domarus, 1110–14. There appears to be no evidence for the assertion by Watt, How War Came, 157, that Hitler came on land sea-sick from his stay on the Deutschland.
124. TBJG, I/6, 297 (23 March 1939).
125. TBJG, I/6, 296 (23 March 1939). Hitler had been taking it for granted for a few months that the former colonies would be returned to Germany (Weinberg II, 512–13). The issue was at best, however, of secondary importance to him, and his somewhat vague presumption was that the colonial question would be solved perhaps in the later 1940s when Germany was the master of the European continent and when the battle-fleet was ready (Klaus Hildebrand, Deutsche Außenpolitik 1933–1945. Kalkül oder Dogma?, Stuttgart etc., 1971, 78–9).
126. DGFP, D, VI, 70–72, No. 61.
127. DBFP, Ser. 3, IV, 463–4, No. 485.
128. Watt, How War Came, 158–9.
129. Below, 157; DGFP, D, VI, 117–19 (quotation, 117), No. 99. Hitler’s stance is not compatible with the post-war claim — on the basis of dubious evidence — that he had already decided upon the military occupation of Poland as early as 8 March, when he spoke to leaders of business, the Party, and the military (Dietrich Eichholtz and Wolfgang Schumann (eds.), Anatomie des Krieges. Neue Dokumente über die Rolle des deutschen Monopolkapitals bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung des zweiten Weltkrieges, East Berlin, 1969, 204–5, Dok.88 (based on reports sent to President Roosevelt on 19 September 1939 by William Christian Bullitt, the United States Ambassador in Paris)).
130. TBJG, I/6, 300 (25 March 1939).
131. Domarus, 1115–16; Watt, How War Came, 160–61.
132. As in Domarus, 1116. Hitler was, however, displeased with Ribbentrop’s clumsy alienation of the Poles, which threatened to do just what he wanted to avoid and drive them into the arms of the British (Bloch, 220).
133. TBJG, I/6, 302 (28 March 1939).
134. Watt, How War Came, 160–61.
135. Weinberg II, 554–5.
