Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis полностью

1. Speer, 163–4; Domarus, 1144; TBJG, I/6, 322 (20 April 1939); Below, 160; Schroeder, 92–4. And see Kurt Pätzold, ‘Hitlers fünfzigster Geburtstag am 20. April 1939’, in Dietrich Eichholtz and Kurt Pätzold (eds.), Der Weg in den Krieg. Studien zur Geschichte der Vorkriegsjahre (1935/36 bis 1939), East Berlin, 1989, 309–43.

2. Domarus, 1146. Henderson, 214, for his recall (and 220 for his return on 25 April).

3. TBJG, I/6, 323 (21 April 1939); Domarus, 1145–6; Below, 161; Schroeder, 94.

4. Fritz Terveen, ‘Der Filmbericht über Hitlers 50. Geburtstag. Ein Beispiel nationalsozialistischer Selbstdarstellung und Propaganda’, VfZ, 7 (1959), 75–84, here 82.

5. TBJG, I/6, 323 (21 April 1939).

6. DBS, vi.435–54.

7. Ilse McKee, Tomorrow the World, London, 1960, 27.

8. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 106, 148–9, 222, for examples.

9. Domarus, 1178; see also Sebastian Haffner, Anmerkungen zu Hitler, Munich, 1978, 43–5.

10. MadR, ii.160–61.

11. MadR, ii.293.

12. GStA, Reichsstatthalter 563, ‘Die Lage der bayerischen Landwirtschaft im Frühjahr 1939’, Fol. 13; see Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 61.

13. MadR, ii.159, 161, 292, 295.

14. MadR, ii.157.

15. BA/MA, RW19/68, ‘Zusammenfassender Überblick’, 31 January 1939, Fol.119.

16. BA/MA, RW19/56, Wehrwirtschaftsinspektion VI, June 1939.

17. BA/MA, RW19/56, Wehrwirtschaftsinspektion VI, July 1939.

18. See the references in Ch.5 n. 41. Though it never posed any serious danger to the regime, the illegal oppositional activity of the Left, especially the Communists, never ceased and appears to have intensified in the years immediately before the war. See Klaus Mammach, ‘Widerstandsaktionen und oppositionelles Verhalten’, in Eichholtz and Pätzold, 403–34.

19. BA, R43II/194, Fol.103.

20. IfZ, Doc. NG-5428.

21. BA, R43II/528. Lammers also regularly brought the reports of the Reich Labour Minister to Hitler’s attention in the years 1935–7, but ceased to do so after 5 January 1938 (R43II/533).

22. BA, R43II/195,Fol.182.

23. See Speer, 229.

24. See Mason, Sozialpolitik, ch.1.

25. Treue, ‘Hitlers Rede vor der deutschen Presse’, 188–9.

26. Wiedemann, 90.

27. Domarus, 1317.

28. See Below, 162.

29. Schneider, 24 October 1952, 8.

30. See Thies, Architekt; and Jost Dülffer, Jochen Thies, and Josef Henke (eds.), Hitlers Städte. Baupolitik im Dritten Reich. Eine Dokumentation, Cologne, 1978.

31. See Martin Broszat and Klaus Schwabe (eds.), Die deutschen Eliten und der Weg in den Zweiten Weltkrieg, Munich, 1989, especially 61–71 (Hitler); 133 (industry’s worries about war); 224–5 (role of diplomats); 285–90 (position of the military after Munich); 383ff. (agrarians’ hopes from expansion).

32. See Fritsch’s remark to von Hassell in December 1938: ‘This man — Hitler — is Germany’s fate for better or worse. If it is now into the abyss,’ which Fritsch thought likely, ‘he will drag us all down with him. There’s nothing to be done’ (Hassell, 71). The remarks betray little recognition of the part Fritsch and those like him had played in placing Hitler in such a position.

33. CD 78, for the length of the speech.

34. Domarus, 1137–8.

35. Below, 161.

36. Domarus, 1173.

37. Domarus, 1148–79 (for the text of the speech; Roosevelt ‘answers’, 1166–79); Shirer, 133, for the laughter of the. deputies.

38. Schneider, Nr.48, 28.22.52, 8.

39. Below, 162. See also Shirer, 133, who thought Hitler’s reply ‘rather shrewd’ in playing to the sympathies of the appeasers.

40. Shirer, 133.

41. Domarus, 1158–9.

42. Watt, How War Came, 196–7; Dirks/Janßen, 94ff.

43. Domarus, 1161 —3.

44. Weinberg II, 560 and n.87, and see 561 and n.90. The avoidance of further negotiations from this date favours the interpretation that Hitler had decided to solve the ‘Polish Question’ by force. (For differing positions on this point, see Müller, Heer, 391, and Henke, England, 242–5.) It is not consonant with the view that he still believed that the Poles could be coerced into accepting his terms. (Watt, How War Came, 196.)

45. Müller, Heer, 392 and n.73; see also Weinberg II, 558 and n.78.

46. Müller, Heer, 390–91 and n.67.

47. Müller, 392. Halder had reservations (393–6), but, in discussions with Beck, one of his arguments about the lack of prospect of opposition was that Danzig was unquestionably a German city (395–6). See also Below, 175; also, Hartmann/Slutsch, ‘Franz Halder und die Kriegsvorbereitungen im Frühjahr 1939’ for Halder’s aggressive speech to military leaders in April 1939, cited in the previous chapter.

48. Dülffer, Marine, 507, 510, 529–30. According to Below, 163, those present were expecting a discussion of ‘Fall Weiß’ (‘Case White’), the plan for the attack on Poland.

49. Weinberg II, 576.