90. DRZW, iv. 24, 446. For a brief sketch of the career of the enigmatic Hoepner, see Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr and Gene Mueller, ‘Generaloberst Erich Hoepner’, in Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.), Hitlers militärische Elite. Bd.2, Vom Kriegsbeginn bis zum Weltkriegsende, Darmstadt, 1998, 93–9.
91. See Arno J. Mayer, Why did the Heavens not Darken? The ‘Final Solution’ in History, New York, 1988, 212.
92. As Ulrich von Hassell put it, shortly before the campaign began: ‘Brauchitsch and Halder have already gone along with Hitler’s manoeuvre of transferring the odium of incendiarism (Mordbrennerei) to the army from the SS, which up to now had alone been burdened with it’ (Hassell, 257 (15 June 1941)).
93. CP, 432 (25 March 1941).
94. Staatsmänner I, 234.
95. Staatsmänner I, 236; Irving, HW, 217, for Abwehr reports of growing anti-government feeling in Yugoslavia.
96. Keitel, 260.
97. DRZW, iii.419.
98. Hillgruber, Strategie, 337; DRZW, iii.418.
99. Weisungen, 80.
100. DRZW, iii.421.
101. Weisungen, 94.
102. Weisungen, 95; DRZW, iii. 423.
103. DRZW, iii.422.
104. See Creveld, 96ff.
105. Creveld, 134–5.
106. DRZW, iii.418 n.10; Domarus, 1623–4.
107. Domarus, 1670; Hauner, Hitler, 158.
108. Weinberg, iii.216.
109. DRZW, iii.438–40.
110. DRZW, iii.442.ff.; Creveld, 139ff.
111. Keitel, 261.
112. TBJG, I/9, 210 (29 March 1941).
113. IMG, xxviii.22, Doc.1746-PS (Hitler’s speech to his military leaders); IfZ, ED 100, Sammlung-Irving, Hewel-Diary, entry for 27 March 1941; Irving, HW, 218.
114. Below, 265.
115. Peter Bor, Gespräche mit Halder, Wiesbaden, 1950, 180. See also Heidemarie Schall-Riancour, Aufstand und Gehorsam. Offizierstum und Generalstab im Umbruch. Leben und Wirken von Generaloberst Franz Halder, Generalstabschef 1938–1942, Wiesbaden, 1972, 159. Creveld, 145, points out that preliminary preparations for a preventive attack on Yugoslavia had been undertaken months earlier, so that the army was not caught as unawares as post-war accounts sometimes claimed.
116. Halder KTB. ii.330–31 (27 March 1941); Below, 265. Ribbentrop was also present.
117. IMG, xxviii.23, Doc.1746-PS; KTB OKW, i.368 (27 March 1941).
118. Keitel, 262.
119. Weisungen, 124–6; Below, 265.
120. Keitel, 262; DRZW, iii.44.8ff.
121. DRZW, iii.451. Initially, the attacks on Greece (‘Marita’) and Yugoslavia (‘Directive 25’) were foreseen as separate operations, starting at different dates in early April. On 29 March it was decided to link the operations. According to the new timetable, the bombing of Belgrade and beginning of ‘Marita’ were put back from 1 to 5 April then, on 3 April, postponed for twenty-four hours (Creveld, 154).
122. TBJG, I/9, 211 (29 March 1941). This was the first time that Goebbels had referred to ‘Barbarossa’ in his diary (Tb Reuth, 1546, n.46).
123. Schmidt, 539–40, 542.
124. Schmidt, 536–9.
125. Irving, HW, 220.
126. The thinking in Tokyo differed sharply on this point. It was presumed that an attack on Singapore would be precisely the step to bring the USA into the war in support of Britain (Staatsmänner, I, 255 and n.5). Hitler reckoned with conflict between Germany and the USA — but not before the conquest of the USSR had given him the basis to undertake such a contest (Staatsmänner, I, 256 n.7; and see Andreas Hillgruber, ‘Hitler und die USA’, in Otmar Franz (ed.), Europas Mitte, Göttingen/Zurich, 1987, 125–44, here 134).
127. Carr, Poland, 146.
128. Schmidt, 540–42; Staatsmänner, i., 244 n.16. According to Schmidt, Hitler himself gave a broad hint on Matsuoka’s departure following his return to Berlin that conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union could not be excluded (Schmidt, 548). By this date, American cryptanalysts had broken Japanese diplomatic codes and were able to read the increasing number of messages, following Matsuoka’s visit, passed to Tokyo by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, General Oshima Hiroshi. By mid-April 1941, US intelligence had detailed information on the forthcoming German invasion of the USSR, and was passing the information to the Russians. (Carl Boyd, Hitler’s Japanese Confidant. General Oshima Hiroshi and MAGIC Intelligence, 1941–1945, Kansas, 1992, 18–21.)
