301. Halder KTB, ii.209–14 (5 December 1940); trans. Halder Diary, 292–8. Hitler amended the operational plan when Jodl presented it to him on 17 December in one significant element. He insisted that strong mobile units from the centre of the front swing northwards from the Warsaw region to ensure the destruction of Soviet forces in the north and subsequently occupy Leningrad and Kronstadt. Only thereafter were operations aimed at Moscow to be undertaken. (Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab), ed. Percy Ernst Schramm (=KTB OKW) Bd.I: 1. August 1940–31. Dezember 1941, Frankfurt am Main, 1965, 233.)
302. Halder KTB, ii.227–8 (13 December 1940).
303. KTB OKW, i.996; Hillgruber, Strategie, 363.
304. Weisungen, 96 (18 December 1940).
305. The Army High Command had until December 1940 used the code-name ‘Otto’ for its operational plan for the east (Halder KTB, ii.210, 214 (5 December 1940)). The Wehrmachtführungsstab, however, had used the designation ‘Fritz’, coined by Loßberg, who (see above n.157) named the operation after his son, for its own campaign-plan. The latter term was then given by Jodl to the draft directive No.21 for the ‘eastern operations’ on 12 December 1940, before being altered to ‘Barbarossa’ five days later. (KTB OKW, i.226, 233. And see B. Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa, Cambridge, Mass., 1973, 16–18; Barry A. Leach, German Strategy against Russia 1939–1941, Oxford, 1973, 79, 82, 258; Dirks/Janßen, ch.9). Confusingly, ‘Otto-Programm’ was also used by the Army for the programme to develop rail and roads in the east (Halder KTB, ii.133 n.3, 210 n.6, 381).
306. KTB OKW, i.257–8; Hillgruber, Strategie, 364–5.
307. Below, 259.
308. Halder KTB, ii.283; trans. Halder Diary, 320 (17 February 1941); Hillgruber, Strategie, 365.
<p>CHAPTER 8: DESIGNING A ‘WAR OF ANNIHILATION’</p>1. Below, 252, 254. He probably exaggerates (259, 279–80) the extent of reservation about the attack on the USSR. See Irving, HW, 181–2, and Irving, Göring, 307–9, for Göring’s initial objections (in November 1940) on economic, not moral, grounds — emphasizing Germany’s dependence on Soviet grain and oil — but rapid capitulation to Hitler’s arguments. Göring’s preferred strategy would have been, acting together with the Italians and Spanish, to force the British out of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and to occupy North Africa and the Balkans.
2. IfZ, F37/3 (1940–41), Kreisleitertagung am 28.11.1940, quotations Fols.290–91 (pp.18–19 of speech). In the earlier part of his speech, Himmler had stated (Fol.277) that Hitler was not interested in destroying the English people and their Empire (‘Dem Führer lag nichts an der Vernichtung des englischen Volkes und Imperiums’), but that the British had refused his offers of peace. The Führer would prefer not to undertake a landing in England, but would do so the following spring if the last resistance was not broken. He saw Britain’s future, after its collapse, residing in a probable merger (‘Fusion’) with America (Fols.279–82). Himmler went on to depict his vision of the future development of the European continent under German domination, before coming to the question of Russia.
3. Hofer, Der Nationalsozialismus, 194.
4. IMG, xxxiv.469, Doc.134-C (Hitler’s comments on 20 January 1941); and, for Hitler’s comments on 20 June 1941 (as noted by General Thomas) on the need to secure all territories needed for the defence economy, IMG, xxvii.220–21, Doc.1456-PS; see also Norman Rich, Hitler’s War Aims. Vol.1: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion, London, 1973, 207; and Carr, Poland, 122–5.
5. See Breitman, Architect, ch.7.
6. Engel, 92 (18 December 1940).
7. DRZW, iv.244; Leach, 159–65; Hillgruber, Strategie, 501–4.
8. Leach, 140.
9. Halder KTB, ii.261 (28 January 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 314.
10. Leach, 141.
11. Bock, Diary, 197–8 (1 February 1941); Leach, 141.
12. Leach, 142–3.
13. Below, 262.
14. Leach, 143–5.
15. KTB OKW, i.339–40 (1 March 1941); DRZW, iv. 244; Leach, 159–61.
16. Halder KTB, ii.319 (17 March 1941); Leach, 162–3.
17. Engel, 92–3 (entry for 17 January 1941); Hillgruber, Strategie, 504 (where Engel’s entry is misdated to 17 March 1941); Leach, 163.
18. CD, 328–9 (16 January 1941, 18 January 1941), for Mussolini’s unease at the visit; Domarus, 1654.
