94. See Halder KTB, ii.463–9, ‘Aufmarschanweisung OKH vom 31.1.1941 “Barbarossa”’ (Leach, 263–9 (OKH Deployment Directive, ‘Barbarossa’, 31 January 1941). The Directive was discussed by Halder and Brauchitsch with the three Army Group Commanders on 31 January 1941, then issued on 19 February 1941 (Halder KTB, ii.264 n.1, 266 (31 January 1941, 2 February 1941). Mention of Moscow was confined to a single sentence: ‘In the event of a sudden unexpected collapse of enemy resistance in northern Russia, the abandonment of the turning movement and an immediate thrust towards Moscow could be considered’ (Halder KTB, ii.465; trans. Leach, 264).
95. Weisungen, 98–9 (No.21, 18 December 1940). Hitler’s significant amendment to the original plan of attack had been conveyed to Jodl on 17 December 1940, the day before the issuing of Directive No.21 for ‘Barbarossa’ (KTB OKW, i.233).
96. Halder KTB, iii.24–5 (29 June 1941).
97. KTB OKW, i.1020; DRZW, iv.486–7; and see Warlimont, 182.
98. DRZW, iv.487.
99. Leach, 197.
100. DRZW, iv.487; Leach, 216.
101. KTB OKW, 1.1030 (during Hitler’s visit to Leeb in Army Group North on 21 July). See also Warlimont, 186; DRZW, iv.495.
102. Weisungen, 166 (23 July 1941); DRZW, iv.490; Leach, 198.
103. KTB OKW, i.1030; Halder KTB, iii.103–7 (23 July 1941), especially 104 and n.1, 106 (quotation); DRZW, iv.491.
104. Weisungen, 165; DRZW, iv.689–93; Leach, 204. Hitler’s Directive No.33 of 19 July 1941, ‘Continuation of the War in the East’, had, however, indicated that air-raids supporting the army on the south-eastern front, not on Moscow, were the first priority (Weisungen, 164–5). Göring later described the raids on Moscow as ‘prestige attacks’, prompted by sarcastic remarks by Hitler casting doubt on whether the Luftwaffe had a single squadron with the courage to raid Moscow (DRZW, iv.693).
105. Leach, 205.
106. Halder KTB, iii.151 (4 August 1941). Under ‘Losses (Verluste)’ Halder noted 46,470 officers and men dead, 11,758 missing, and 155,073 injured.
107. Leach, 205–7, 210.
108. Leach, 207.
109. KTB OKW, 1.1033.
110. DRZW, iv.493.
111. 111. KTB OKW, i.1037, 1040.
112. Warlimont, 185; Leach, 208.
113. KTB OKW, i.1040; DRZW, iv.495–6; Leach, 209.
114. Halder KTB, iii. 134 (30 July 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 490.
115. Weisungen, 168–9; DRZW, iv.495; Leach, 209.
116. DRZW, iv.495–6.
117. DRZW, iv. 499–500.
118. Halder KTB, iii.170 (11 August 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 506.
119. Weisungen, 173; and see DRZW, iv.503; Warlimont, 187.
120. DRZW, iv.504.
121. TBJG, II/1, 258 (19 August 1941). Hitler’s own — exaggerated — view was that he had not been ill since he was sixteen years old (Monologe, 190 (9–10 January 1942)).
122. Irving, Doctor, 87–8; Irving, HW, 293–5.
123. TBJG, II/i, 260–3 (19 August 1941).
124. Laurence Rees, War of the Century. When Hitler Fought Stalin, London, 1999, 52–6; Volko-gonov, 412–13.
125. TBJG, II/1, 266 (19 August 1941).
126. KTB OKW, 11.1055–9; DRZW, iv.505.
127. Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit. Schicksalsstunden der deutschen Armee 1923–1945, Tübingen/Stuttgart, 1950, 132–5; Warlimont, 189 (whose translation has been used).
128. KTB OKW, i.1061–3 (Halder’s memorandum, and Hitler’s order); Halder KTB, iii.192 (22 August 1941), trans. Halder Diary, 514; Warlimont, 190.
129. KTB OKW, i.1065; Halder KTB, iii.193 (22 August 1941); DRZW, iv.506; Warlimont, 190–91.
130. KTB OKW, ii.1063–8 (Hitler’s ‘Study’); DRZW, iv.505–6.
131. Halder KTB, iii.193 (22 August 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 515; and see Bock, 290–91 (23 August 1941), and Hartmann, 283.
132. Above from Guderian, 198–202.
133. Hartmann, 283–4; Halder’s reaction to Guderian’s change of mind in Halder KTB, iii.194–5 (24 August 1941).
134. Bock, 291 (24 August 1941); Hartmann, 284 n.57.
135. A point made by Warlimont, 191.
136. DRZW, iv.514, 516, 516 n.252; Leach, 222 (slightly different figures).
137. Leach, 222.
138. DRZW, iv.516; Warlimont, 193, on agreement now on the necessity of reaching Moscow before the winter.
